## 1NC

### T/Framework

#### The affirmative’s failure to advance a topical defense of federal policy undermines debate’s transformative and intellectual potential

#### “Resolved” proves the framework for the resolution is to enact policy

**Words and Phrases ‘64** Permanent Edition

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Everything after the colon matters.

**Webster’s** Guide to Grammar and Writing – 2000 <http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### “Should” denotes an expectation of that

**American Heritage** Dictionary – 2000 [www.dictionary.com]

3 Used to express probability or expectation

#### “The USFG” is the government in Washington D.C.

Microsoft **Encarta** Online Encyclopedia 2000 [http://encarta.msn.com]

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC.”

#### and, our definition excludes action by smaller political groups or individuals.

**Black’s Law Dictionary** Seventh Edition Ed. Bryan A. Garner (chief) 1999

Federal government 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national political matters.

#### Increase is to make greater by quantity – Aff doesn’t meet because they explicitly defend qualitative increases

**California Superior Courts, 1916** (The Pacific Reporter vol. 158, Google Ebooks, http://books.google.com/books?id=pbKZAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA1063&lpg=PA1063&dq=%22increase+is+to+add%22&source=bl&ots=z2K\_fTs-Yj&sig=e8al1Wg2wLXwtqTa27Jqy3xYkHU&hl=en&ei=eeodTsnRPK\_LsQKfgdGuCA&sa=X&oi=book\_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBQQ6AEwADgK#v=onepage&q=%22increase%20is%20to%20add%22&f=false)

'The constitutional provision in question is founded in good sense and Justice, but it cannot justly be so construed as to prevent the Legislature from supplying a manifest ellipsis in the law—to correct an obvious inadvertence whose result, if permitted to remain uncorrected, must be to hamper in no Inconsiderable degree the proper administration of public affairs under a system established by the people themselves through their Constitution. There is nothing in the Constitution implying that persons performing public services shall not be compensated, and adequately compensated, therefor. On the contrary, that instrument contemplates that all public servants shall be justly compensated for their public services. The very provision in question so implies, as reasonably may it even be said of the provision which forbids the payment of judicial officers for their services as such In the form of fees required by the law. to be paid to them for certain official acts. The Constitution has, save in an exceptional instance or two, committed to the Legislature the duty of making that body fails wholly to do Its duty in that regard, it must be assumed that the omission has been due entirely to an oversight or inadvertence. To hold it to be true, then, that In such a case an act, whose purpose is merely to correct the inadvertence and so provide for compensation—provide for something which theretofore had not existed— amounts to an "increase" of compensation within the import of the constitutional provision in question would be to give to that provision a most unreasonable construction or a construction from which most unjust consequences would follow, where the Legislature had failed to do its duty in that regard. But the provision referred to cannot in reason be given such a construction. Indeed, such a construction would amount to a palpable solecism in logic. It would give to the word "Increase" a signification opposed to what it naturally implies, for the act of "increasing" anything necessarily presupposes the existence in some measure or to some extent of something which may be enlarged. In other words, to effect an increase is to add something to or enlarge something already in existence; or, as Webster's Dictionary defines the word "increase," it is "that which is added to the original stock by augmentation or growth—to extend or enlarge in size, extent, quantity, number, Intensity, value, substance," etc. It would be no less absurd to attempt to conceive a process by which something may be added to nothing than it would be to attempt to conceive the subtraction of something from nothing. If a person owning no money or other kind of property suddenly becomes the owner of property or money, his wealth has not thereby been "Increased" within the lexicology or signification of that word. He has simply acquired something which previously he did not have.

#### A voting issue for limits and ground---our entire negative strategy is based on the “should” question of the resolution---there are an infinite number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote affirmative--- these all obviate the only predictable strategies based on topical action---they overstretch our research burden and undermine preparedness for all debates

#### A limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to productive inculcation of decision-making and advocacy skills in every and all facets of life---even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable---this still provides room for flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion to avoid mere statements of fact---T debates also solve any possible turn

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Clash is a pre-requisite to evaluating the merits of the 1AC - Choosing affirmation over fairness distorts the dialogue to a monological form of discourse that undermines any benefit to the affirmation

**Hanghoj 8**

Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor. <http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf> Herm

**Debate games** are often based on **pre-designed** scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as **debate scenarios** allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific **game space**. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, **all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces** (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the **rules** and outcomes **of the game**, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the **open-ended** goals, roles and resources represent **centrifugal** elements and create **virtually endless possibilities** for **researching**, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a **balance** between focusing **too narrowly** on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) **and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation**). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point **with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues** in which **the teacher never learns anything new from the students**, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, **discourse becomes monologised when “someone who** knows and **possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant** of it **and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher** (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) **and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism”** (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that **“one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself**” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Breaking down predictability is self-defeating and impossible---creativity inevitably depends upon constraints, the attempt to wish away the structure of predictability collapses the very structure their aff depends on---it’s better to retain predictability and be creative within it

Armstrong 2K – Paul B. Armstrong, Professor of English and Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, Winter 2000, “The Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser's Aesthetic Theory,” New Literary History, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 211-223

Such a play-space also opposes the notion that the only alternative to the coerciveness of consensus must be to advocate the sublime powers of rule-breaking. 8 Iser shares Lyotard's concern that to privilege harmony and agreement in a world of heterogeneous language games is to limit their play and to inhibit semantic innovation and the creation of new games. Lyotard's endorsement of the "sublime"--the pursuit of the "unpresentable" by rebelling against restrictions, defying norms, and smashing the limits of existing paradigms--is undermined by contradictions, however, which Iser's explication of play recognizes and addresses. The paradox of the unpresentable, as Lyotard acknowledges, is that it can only be manifested through a game of representation. The sublime is, consequently, in Iser's sense, an instance of doubling. If violating norms creates new games, this crossing of boundaries depends on and carries in its wake the conventions and structures it oversteps. The sublime may be uncompromising, asocial, and unwilling to be bound by limits, but its pursuit of what is not contained in any order or system makes it dependent on the forms it opposes. [End Page 220] The radical presumption of the sublime is not only terroristic in refusing to recognize the claims of other games whose rules it declines to limit itself by. It is also naive and self-destructive in its impossible imagining that it can do without the others it opposes. As a structure of doubling, the sublime pursuit of the unpresentable requires a play-space that includes other, less radical games with which it can interact. Such conditions of exchange would be provided by the nonconsensual reciprocity of Iserian play. Iser's notion of play offers a way of conceptualizing power which acknowledges the necessity and force of disciplinary constraints without seeing them as unequivocally coercive and determining. The contradictory combination of restriction and openness in how play deploys power is evident in Iser's analysis of "regulatory" and "aleatory" rules. Even the regulatory rules, which set down the conditions participants submit to in order to play a game, "permit a certain range of combinations while also establishing a code of possible play. . . . Since these rules limit the text game without producing it, they are regulatory but not prescriptive. They do no more than set the aleatory in motion, and the aleatory rule differs from the regulatory in that it has no code of its own" (FI 273). Submitting to the discipline of regulatory restrictions is both constraining and enabling because it makes possible certain kinds of interaction that the rules cannot completely predict or prescribe in advance. Hence the existence of aleatory rules that are not codified as part of the game itself but are the variable customs, procedures, and practices for playing it. Expert facility with aleatory rules marks the difference, for example, between someone who just knows the rules of a game and another who really knows how to play it. Aleatory rules are more flexible and open-ended and more susceptible to variation than regulatory rules, but they too are characterized by a contradictory combination of constraint and possibility, limitation and unpredictability, discipline and spontaneity.

#### Failure to play Devil’s advocate undermines persuasion and there’s no offense because it doesn’t cause role confusion

**LUCKHARDT and BECHTEL 1994** (C. Grant and William, How to do Things with Logic, p 179)

This diagram indicates that first the arguers present their argument(s) for the conclusion in which they believe, here represented as A. Then the arguers formulate the best argument(s) possible for the exact opposite conclusion. If they argue in the first demonstration that, say, the best diagnosis for a patient is cholera, then as a second argumentative step the arguers will present the case for the best diagnosis not being cholera. As a third step, this strategy requires that the arguers then critique this second demonstration as well as possible. If that critique is successful, then the original demonstration stands, and the conclusion that follows is the original one, A. Why, you might wonder, would anyone ever want to engage in what may appear to be logical gymnastics? The answer is that this strategy is useful in two ways. As a method for discovering the truth of a matter, it is often **extremely helpful** in warding off the intellectual malady called “**tunnel vision**.” This is the tendency we all have to stick to our first view of a matter, failing to recognize contrary evidence as it comes in, and thus failing to revise our view to be consistent with it. In extreme cases of tunnel vision contrary evidence to one’s original view may even be noticed but be **treated as *confirming* the original view**. Requiring medical students who believe the patient has cholera to present the best case against this diagnosis will often cause them to rethink the case they had originally made. The conclusion in the end may still be the same as the original diagnosis—cholera—but now it will be a conclusion that has taken other options seriously. The devil’s advocate strategy has much to recommend in terms of its persuasiveness. Having demonstrated to your audience that you are aware of a case to be made against A, but that that case must fail, you will be perceived as having been extremely open-minded in your considerations. And you *will* have been open-minded, provided that you do not hedge in your demonstration of –A. You are not being a true devil’s advocate if your demonstration of –A is so weak that it is easily criticized in the third step. It is very tempting to hedge your demonstration of –A in this way, but also dangerous, for it invites your audience to point out that there is a better case against A than the one you have presented.

#### Roleplaying is key to learn the elite’s vocabulary

**SCHAAP 2005** (Andrew, University of Melbourne, Politics, Vol 25 Iss 1, February)

Learning political theory is largely about acquiring a vocabulary that enables one to reflect more critically and precisely about the terms on which human beings (do and should) co-operate for and compete over public goods, symbolic and material. As such, political theory is necessarily abstract and general. But, competency in political theory requires an ability to move from the general to the particular and back again, not simply by applying general principles to particular events and experiences but by reflecting on and rearticulating concepts in the light of the particular. Role play is an effective technique for teaching political theory because it requires that students employ political concepts in a particular context so that learning takes place as students try out new vocabularies together with their peers and a lifelong learner in the subject: their teacher.

#### Academic debate over energy policy in the face of environmental destruction is critical to shape the direction of change and create a public consciousness shift

Crist 4 (Eileen, Professor at Virginia Tech in the Department of Science and Technology, “Against the social construction of nature and wilderness”, Environmental Ethics 26;1, p 13-6, http://www.sts.vt.edu/faculty/crist/againstsocialconstruction.pdf)

Yet, constructivist analyses of "nature" favor remaining in the comfort zone of zestless agnosticism and noncommittal meta-discourse. As David Kidner suggests, this intellectual stance may function as a mechanism against facing the devastation of the biosphere—an undertaking long underway but gathering momentum with the imminent bottlenecking of a triumphant global consumerism and unprecedented population levels. Human-driven extinction—in the ballpark of Wilson's estimated 27,000 species per year—is so unthinkable a fact that choosing to ignore it may well be the psychologically risk-free option.

Nevertheless, this is the opportune historical moment for intellectuals in the humanities and social sciences to join forces with conservation scientists in order to help create the consciousness shift and policy changes to stop this irreversible destruction. Given this outlook, how students in the human sciences are trained to regard scientific knowledge, and what kind of messages percolate to the public from the academy about the nature of scientific findings, matter immensely. The "agnostic stance" of constructivism toward "scientific claims" about the environment—a stance supposedly mandatory for discerning how scientific knowledge is "socially assembled"[32]—is, to borrow a legendary one-liner, striving to interpret the world at an hour that is pressingly calling us to change it.

### K

#### Their vision of politics liberates the human mind --- advances in orientation recycle the same utopian ideals of progressivism

Ophuls ’11 - former member of the U.S. Foreign Service and has taught political science at Northwestern University (Ophuls, William. “Plato's Revenge: Politics in the Age of Ecology.” 19 August 2011. P. 1-9)

From this perspective, the rise of civilization constitutes a Faustian bargain or even a tragic fall from primal grace. When human beings abandoned the ecological niche in which they had evolved, they left a state of natural plenitude, however rough, for a life of toil in ﬁeld and mine. They became more numerous and prosperous but less healthy. 4 The technological means that they used to enrich themselves also harmed nature and turned war from a blood sport into a vehicle for conquest or extermination. Liberty was replaced by authority, equality by hierarchy, and fraternity by disunity. The many, who had once lived in small bands as kinsmen and equals, became subject to the few — to the emperors, kings, and tyrants who expropriated the wealth they produced. Natural religion gave way to organized religion, whose priests, rites, and doctrines served mostly the oppressors ’ interests, even as they gave some solace to the estranged denizens of the ancient cities. In short, the indisputable advantages of civilization were purchased at a high price. 5 Much of this was apparent to the philosophers and states- men who created the modern world, but their diagnosis of the disease — and therefore their proposed treatment — was ﬂawed. They sought to cure two of the ﬁve great ills (economic inequality and political oppression) by intensifying two others — ecological exploitation and military aggression. As a result, the modern age is marked by the ethos of the conquis- tador. Scientists master nature in their laboratories so that engineers can build arsenals and factories, manufacturers can make arms and goods, and soldiers and merchants can domi- nate the lands and markets of the world. These thinkers were driven by a quest for power — for dominion over nature, which would foster dominion over the world. But as Lord Acton famously said, power corrupts, and the more absolute the power, the worse the corruption. Indeed, power seems to drive men and women mad, with hubris being the worst symptom of the disease. The response of the Enlightenment philosophes to the ﬁfth great ill was equally problematic. They set about liberating men and women from clerical religion because they detested the venality, inquisitorial zeal, and reactionary politics of the established church, and they succeeded all too well in crushing Voltaire ’ s inf â me . When the babe of morality was thrown out with the bathwater of superstition, the consequence was a process of demoralization that began slowly but has now become a rout. This demoralization has three aspects — the corruption of morals and mores, the undermining of morale, and the spread- ing of confusion — and has resulted in the loss of almost all sense of honor, duty, and responsibility. Solidarity, too, has eroded, as individuals and groups engage in a **winner-take-all struggle** for power and wealth. However glutted with goods people in rich countries may be, they feel that they are subject to a vast, impersonal, out-of-control system that gives them the vote, that mostly abides by juridical rules, but that denies them real liberty and equality. Fraternity is not even an issue. Last but not least, because God is dead and only instrumental reason counts, all authority and orientation have been over- thrown — so men and women have lost not only their intellectual and spiritual bearings but even the means by which to take them. The ﬁ ve great ills of civilization therefore have become evils that threaten the continued existence of human society. Eco- logical exploitation has degenerated into the systematic and ruthless abuse of nature, causing an accelerated degra dation and depletion of our natural milieu. We ourselves have begun to suffer certain inconveniences, and our grandchildren stand to inherit a poisoned and impoverished planet. Indeed, as the age of petroleum draws to a close, the material basis for an advanced technological culture capable of supporting billions of people in sprawling megacities is by no means assured. Similarly, military aggression has escalated **into potential [omnicide**] holocaust, as Weapons of Mass Destruction are ever more widely disseminated. And wars are no longer fought by brave warriors and wily generals who meet face to face on a battle- ﬁeld but by military bureaucrats and technicians who risk nothing as they rain electronic death on remotely seen enemies — or unarmed innocents. In the same way, our economic system has vastly ampliﬁ ed the scope and scale of economic inequality. Despite a general rise in material well-being, wealth is radically maldistributed, and billions of people continue to live in destitution and misery. In addition, the rich command resources unimaginable to ancient kings, so the rod by which deprivation is measured has grown enormously. Nor has political oppression vanished. Even in states where the principle of liberty is well established, the burden of bureaucratic regulation becomes ever more minute, all encom- passing, and suffocating. Traditional liberties are being eroded in the name of expediency in efforts to defend national security and ﬁ ght terrorism, crime, drugs, and tax evasion. A sphere of privacy hardly exists anymore. Meanwhile, democracy is mostly a sham: either money rules, or remote policy elites in cahoots with powerful economic interests make all the important decisions. Lastly, spiritual malaise is pandemic. As a result, demo- ralized individuals must struggle to keep their psychic footing. Many resort to diseased methods of coping, not only physical addiction to drugs, alcohol, and tobacco but also psychological addiction to eating, entertainment, gambling, pornography, sex, shopping, and sports. Many simply cannot cope. The armies of social workers and psychotherapists may help a handful of individuals, but they can do little to save society, which becomes fertile ground for every form of mania. This demoralization was never intended by the thinkers who created the modern world. Believing as they did (and not without reason) that organized religion was an almost unmiti- gated evil, they sought to liberate us from religious politics — from the interference of an established church in the public affairs of the state and the private affairs of the individual. Thanks to their efforts, we in the West are no longer subject to clerical oppression or to a despotic form of spirituality, for which we must be eternally grateful. But we have paid a steep price for this liberation. Indeed, far from creating a rational utopia, banishing superstition and exalting reason have created a spiritual void that has been ﬁ lled by absurd and dangerous political, social, and economic ideologies that have often proven to be as patho- logical in their historical consequences as the dogmatic religions of old. In retrospect, it may seem surprising that the philosophes had so few qualms about crushing the established church, one of the pillars of the existing social order. But they believed that traditional religion was dispensable precisely because they were certain that human reason, once liberated from theology, would soon discover the moral order implicit within the cosmos — an order to which men and women, being reasonable beings, would naturally and willingly accede. That did not happen. The secularization promoted by the Enlightenment took on a logic and momentum of its own. Rationalism displaced reason, so the only permissible natural laws were mechanical, not moral. Human beings also turned out to be far less reasonable and **much more irrational** than these thinkers assumed. The triumph of secularism has had consequences that are devastating in the political sphere. A purely rational and material politics — a politics without a moral code or a vision of the good life or a sense of the sacred — is a contradiction in terms. As Aristotle pointed out, no polity can long exist as “ a mere alliance ” of self-interested individuals. 6 What makes a political community cohere is what Aristotle called “ a rule of life ” — that is, a shared ethos. 7 But the rule of life of modern politics is that we shall have no positive rules, only negative ones that keep us from harming others but that otherwise leave us at liberty. The citizens themselves must sustain community through social institutions — churches, schools, voluntary associations, infor- mal networks — that inculcate a shared ethos and foster a sense of common destiny. In other words, the indispensable linchpin of the modern state is civil society, for it alone supplies the cohesion that a liberal polity lacks. Unfortunately, the process of demoralization described above has effectively destroyed the morals, mores, and morale of civil society. As a result, polity today is more and more a mere alliance of self-interested individuals who pursue their own private ends and who accept only minimal restraints on their actions. Liberty has become license, and the social basis of the modern, liberal state has eroded away. In effect, the project of modern politics has failed. When Hobbes took the radical step of severing politics from virtue and founding the polity on the self-interested individual, he started a movement that **liberated men and women** from subservience to king and bishop, but he ***also* set in motion** a **vicious circle of moral decay** that has all but overwhelmed civil society. The legal and bureaucratic machinery of government has grown larger and more oppressive in a mostly vain attempt to make up for social decline. We are being driven toward an administrative despotism that extinguishes both liberty and privacy because it is the most expedient way to deal with the moral breakdown caused by our basic political principles. It is bad enough that a secular and rational politics has destroyed its own foundation and now seems bent on creating a Leviathan. What is even more dangerous is that casting men and women loose from their traditional cultural and religious moorings leaves them adrift in a meaningless cosmos, lacking clear metaphysical or practical answers to the basic problems of life. The resulting spiritual vertigo is responsible for much of the social and personal dysfunction mentioned above and also for the calamitous history of the twentieth century. Only a few artists, philosophers, and free spirits thrive on the radical openness of cultural nihilism. The average person hates it, and if people do not get satisfactory answers to the questions of life from their inherited culture, then they will seek them else- where. This explains the popular appeal of the fanatical ide- ologies that drenched the last century in blood (and of the religious fundamentalism that now threatens to do the same in this one). In reality, the Enlightenment did not so much abolish reli- gion as redirect the spiritual drive of the Judeo-Christian tradi- tion toward worldly ends. We moderns are just as religious as our premodern ancestors, but we have chosen to worship two savage gods — Moloch and Mammon. Those who worship Moloch turn politics into a **perverted religion**. They try to ﬁll the void caused by cultural nihilism with eschatological secular creeds **dedicated to achieving a utopian ideal** of social perfec- tion. Those who worship Mammon turn politics into a religion of the self. They try to fill the void by glutting themselves with pleasure, exalting their **own self-gratification into a moral principle** and exploiting the state for selﬁ sh ends. These are both false gods. Neither ideology nor self-indulgence can satisfy the spiritual needs of human beings or make them truly happy, and both tend toward destruction. Our secular, rational, amoral way of life is failing. Our cultural myth to the contrary notwithstanding, this way of life represents **not a ﬁnal progressive advance** of civilization to “ the end of history ” but an **intensiﬁcation** of civilization’s ***inherent* ﬂaws** that can **end only in tragedy**. We must reinvent civilization so that it once again rests on a moral foundation by discovering a new “ rule of life ” that moderates, rather than magniﬁ es, the ﬁve great ills. And we now have the means to do so. The epistemological and ontological revolution of the twentieth century that produced systems ecology, particle physics, and depth psychology reveals a moral order that is immanent within the scientiﬁc description of the universe. From this order — “ written on the tablets of eternity ” — we can derive principles that could form the basis for humane and prudent governance. In other words, we have rediscovered the kind of natural law that the philosophes envisioned. We now understand, better than our Enlightenment ancestors, the means by which we can actualize these principles without resurrecting the evils of organized religion. In this book, I begin by examining the role played by law in human society before showing that ecology, physics, and psychology all agree in pointing us toward a politics of consciousness dedicated to expanding human awareness rather than extending human dominion. Unless the means of civilization are soon directed to an end that is higher than the endless accumulation of wealth and power, then the very enterprise of civilization itself, not just our particular form of it, may not long survive.

#### Liberating agency is the root cause of all their impacts and extinction --- the aff can’t solve human defects

Ophuls ’11 - former member of the U.S. Foreign Service and has taught political science at Northwestern University (Ophuls, William. “Plato's Revenge: Politics in the Age of Ecology.” 19 August 2011. P. 70-74)

The portrait of the psyche that emerges is cautionary. As much as contemporary humans would like to believe that we have transcended our evolutionary origins, our animal nature lives on within us — **in our genes and** in our **minds**. Witness the architecture of the human brain, in which the cerebral cortex enfolds a mammalian limbic system wrapped around a reptilian core. Hence, said Jung, Every civilized human being, however high his conscious develop- ment, is still an archaic man at the deeper levels of his psyche. Just as the human body connects us with the mammals and displays numerous vestiges of earlier evolutionary stages going back even to the reptilian age, so the human psyche is a product of evolution which, when followed back to its origins, shows countless archaic traits. 2 In effect, Jung concludes, a “ 2,000,000-year-old man ” dwells in all of us. Even the distinctively human part of our nature associated with the cortex is irredeemably Paleolithic. 3 As a consequence, men and women are constantly agitated by primordial drives and conﬂicting emotions that they only partly understand and struggle to control — and that they are usually not even aware of. Much is healthy and good in human beings, but we have propensities for sickness and evilthat must not be ignored. Anthropology supports this bleak assessment of the human psyche. With few exceptions, there are no harmless people, and the savage mind, whatever its virtues, is often prey to unconscious forces and raw emotions (and is therefore the author of savage behavior). A review of the anthropological literature reveals three seemingly universal tendencies of the human mind: we are **prone to superstition** and magical thinking, we are **predisposed to paranoia**, **and we project our own hostility onto others**. 4 In essence, says Melvin Konner, chronic fear pervades the psyche and drives human behavior. 5 Although the last word has yet to be spoken, there seems to be an emerging scientiﬁ c consensus: we humans are a volatile mix of animal, primal, and civil — a tangle of emotions and drives that all but guarantees inner and outer conﬂ icts. That human nature is partly animal nature is not entirely a bad thing. Instinct is necessary for a healthy psyche and a moral society. But for human beings to live peacefully in crowded civilizations, the more bestial and savage aspects of man ’ s nature have to be actively discouraged by society. Konner puts it more forcefully. Because of our fear-driven antisocial propensities, we humans are “ evil ” by nature and therefore **need a “ Torah, ” or** an equivalent **ethical code, to forestall the** war of all against all. 6 In practice, this means that mores are essential because they tip the balance between good and evil in human nature. Good ones turn fal- lible, passionate men and women into reasonably upright members of society, while bad ones turn them into feral menaces to society. This conclusion does not follow from theory alone; it has been empirically demonstrated. The social psychologist Stanley Milgram showed how simple it is to create little Adolf Eich- manns who obediently inﬂ ict severe pain on hapless experi- mental subjects. 7 In an even more frightening experiment, his colleague Philip Zimbardo contrived to convert ordinary, presumably decent students into punitive monsters. In the infamous Stanford prison experiment, student volunteers were randomly assigned to be either guards or prisoners. In a matter of days, the former turned harsh and sadistic, the latter cringing or rebellious, and the experiment had to be aborted to avert physical harm to the prisoners. 8 In effect, psychology has rediscovered what were once called “ the passions ” — the welter of conﬂicting and potentially **dan- gerous impulses and emotions** that lurk in every human breast and that threaten to erupt under the slightest provocation unless they are kept in check by personal character or social control. Recall the words of Burke: “ Society cannot exist unless a controlling power on will and appetite be placed some- where. ” The choice is between self-imposed “ moral chains ” or externally imposed “ fetters. ” In his Politics , Aristotle identiﬁ ed the essential political challenge: For as man is the best of the animals when perfected, so he is the worst of all when sundered from law and justice . . . [because he] is born possessing weapons for the use of wisdom and virtue, which it is possible to employ entirely for the opposite ends. Hence, when devoid of virtue man is the most unholy and savage of animals. 9 When individuals gather in crowds, the challenge increases by orders of magnitude because fear, greed, and anger are contagious. As Gustave Le Bon pointed out long ago, crowds amplify every human defect and manifest many new ones of their own. “ The masses, ” said Jung, “ always incline to herd psychology, hence they are easily stampeded; and to mob psychology, hence their witless brutality and hysterical emo- tionalism. ” 10 Nietzsche was even more scathing: “ Insanity in individuals is something rare — but in groups, parties, nations, and epochs it is the rule. ” 11 The greatest Weapon of Mass Destruction on the planet is therefore the collective human ego. History teaches that the human capacity for evil is virtually unlimited. Unless wisdom and virtue are deployed to counteract ego ’ s potential for destruction, actual destruction is inevitable as men and women forget their better nature and become unholy and savage animals. This new yet old understanding of human nature is enough by itself to demolish modern hubris. Inﬁ nite social progress is as much of a chimera as inﬁ nite material progress. The “ 2,000,000-year-old man ” is what he is and will not be improved, only tamed. Indeed, at this point in human history, the essential task is forestalling racial suicide, not pursuing social perfection. To this cautionary portrait of human nature, we must now add the limits of human cognition. As has been shown, the human perceptual apparatus is a trickster. We are in touch not with reality but with a kind of shadow play **projected onto the screen of the psyche** **by** invisible deep structures. We have also seen that even the ﬁnest intellects struggle to comprehend complex, self-organizing systems, for nature does not make it easy for us to know reality. But the fault does not lie in nature. The human mind was simply not created to unravel the mys- teries of quantum mechanics or to comprehend the intricate dynamics of the global climate regime. It was instead cobbled together and then honed to perfection by evolution for one speciﬁ c purpose — survival as hunter-gatherers on the African savannah. We are Jung ’ s “ 2,000,000-year-old man ” not just emotionally but also cognitively. We are hardwired to perceive in certain ways and not in others. Above all, human cognition is “ designed ” for concrete perception, so primal peoples are masters of what anthropolo- gist Claude L é vi-Strauss called “ the sciences of the concrete. ” 12 This is by no means an inferior mode of thought. The savage is not, as we tend to think, a mere captive of strange fancies and outlandish beliefs. He is actually more of an empiricist than the physicist because he perceives his world directly and immediately whereas the latter ﬁ lters nature through an elabo- rate intellectual apparatus made up of mathematical, theoreti- cal, and technological lenses. So the abstraction associated with literacy, civilization, and, above all, scientiﬁ c investiga- tion is not natural but acquired — and only with great difﬁ culty after years of schooling. Even schooling cannot entirely eradicate the innate pro- pensity for concreteness in the human mind. For instance, we daily commit the epistemological sin of reiﬁcation — regarding abstractions or ideas, such as energy or the market, as if they were somehow as real as rocks and trees rather than constructs that help us understand complex phenomena. Likewise, our opinions have a tendency to become “ set in concrete, ” resist- ing all evidence to the contrary. 13 But perhaps the most egregious instance of what Whitehead called “ the fallacy of misplaced concreteness ” is that so many otherwise sane human beings believe in the absolute, literal truth of the manifestly mythological accounts contained in various scriptures — refusing to accept archeological and historical evidence to the contrary or even to entertain the possibility that these accounts could be ﬁngers pointing at the ineffable rather than expressions of concrete truth. 14 Sadly, many, if not most, human beings are not capable of rising very far above Piaget ’ s concrete operational stage of cognition. 15 Hence they cannot be said truly to comprehend the social and physical reality of life in complex civilizations — a life far removed from the comparatively simple and concrete existence of the hunter-gatherer, which centered on day-to-day survival amid an intimate circle of kinsmen and friends. As a corollary, the untutored human mind focuses on the present and the dramatic. The imperative of survival on the savannah made us sensitive to immediate or striking dangers — but comparatively oblivious to long-term trends, risks, and consequences, especially ones that are inconspicuous. Our attention is not grabbed by the creeping destruction of habitat, the imperceptible extinction of species, the continual accumu- lation of pollutants, the gradual loss of topsoil, the steady depletion of aquifers, and the like. Rather, we tend to ﬁ xate on dramatic symptoms (such as the occasional major oil spill) while ignoring the far greater long-term threat to ecosystems posed by quotidian events (such as the daily dribble of petro- chemicals from a multiplicity of sources, which is far greater and much more damaging over the long term). Unfortunately, dribbles are not the stuff of melodrama and so tend not to register strongly, even when brought to our attention by the media. So it takes a crisis to thrust stealthy perils into full awareness. Unfortunately, says biologist Richard Dawkins, the human brain was simply not built to understand slow, cumulative processes like evolutionary or ecological change, which demand an acute sensitivity to the long-term consequences of small changes. 16 Since long-term observation and planning were not critical for our early survival, these mental attributes were not reinforced by evolutionary selection. Ecology and its implications are therefore poorly understood, even by the informed public. More generally, the human mind ’ s inability to escape the clutches of the present leads to the habitual, shortsighted pursuit of current advantage to the detriment of future well-being. In addition, the survival imperative endowed us with a host of cognitive shortcuts — unconscious mental algorithms that may have been essential on the savannah but that must be consciously set aside if we humans are to live sanely in civiliza- tion. For example, the human mind tends to be quick to decide. Like any animal, we are emotionally wired for ﬁ ght or ﬂ ight, which means that our savage minds are also cognitively wired to jump to conclusions. When early humans spotted a tan shape lurking in the elephant grass, the minds that decided “ lion ” soonest had the best chance to pass their genes down to posterity. The human mind is also dualistic, so it is constrained, if not compelled, to choose one pole or the other — ﬁ ght or ﬂ ight, black or white, right or wrong — not the middle ground. This has been experimentally demonstrated at the perceptual level: when humans look at a classical optical illusion, they see either the lady or the vase, never both at once. In other words, the human mind naturally dichotomizes, creating the common oppositions of “ good ” and “ bad, ” “ us ” versus “ them, ” the “ two sides ” of any issue, “ left ” against “ right ” in politics, and so on. Unfortunately, as F. Scott Fitzgerald noted, it takes a ﬁ rst-rate intelligence to hold two opposing ideas in mind at the same time and still continue to function, so untutored minds readily afﬁx themselves to one of the poles and oppose the other. **This explains** the **perennial conﬂict** between believers and inﬁdels that has occasioned untold historical misery.

#### The alternative is paideia – it is an acceptance of Platonic authoritarianism is the only way out to curb human destruction of the environment

Ophuls ’11 - former member of the U.S. Foreign Service and has taught political science at Northwestern University (Ophuls, William. “Plato's Revenge: Politics in the Age of Ecology.” 19 August 2011. P. 129-133)

Politeia is the means for realizing the ends of therapeia and paideia . Wisdom and virtue do not arise spontaneously in human beings, especially those who reside in complex civiliza- tions, so morality must be institutionalized and inculcated by a polity dedicated to fostering and upholding society ’ s norms and mores. The polity’s role is to govern — to direct affairs in a way that citizens are encouraged to **follow a moral code** or are swiftly checked when they fail to do so. (All the rest of what we call politics is politicking, policing, and administra- tion.) Provided that the code reﬂ ects an elevated ideal, such as excellence or wisdom, the result will be a rule of life that is relatively sane and humane. We live at a historical juncture that will challenge govern- ments as never before. Liberal society owes its existence to the bubble of ecological afﬂuence fueled by the “ discovery ” of the New World and the exploitation of the stored solar energy in fossil fuels. 2 Those who have grown up in afﬂ uent societies have therefore enjoyed unprecedented opportunities and freedoms, as well as levels of comfort and plenty all but unimaginable to our ancestors. But the **impending** return of **ecological scarcity** means that the expectations and aspirations of billions of indi- viduals cannot be met and that individual wants will increas- ingly be subordinated to collective needs. Governments now confront the **Herculean task** **of effecting an epochal** economic, social, and political transition from the industrial age to the age of ecology. The question is whether this can be achieved without lapsing into totalitarian tyranny or religious despotism. To escape such a fate will require us to break decisively with our habitual response to societal problems: passing laws that give governments ever more administrative power. The extraor- dinary nature of the challenge exposes us to the eternal and inescapable dilemma of politics in a particularly acute form. As Lord Acton observed, because power inevitably corrupts, no can be entrusted with it: “ The danger is not that a particular class is unﬁ t to govern. Every class is unﬁ t to govern. ” 3 The maxim “ That government is best which governs least ” follows as a matter of course. As John Stuart Mill says in concluding On Liberty , A government cannot have too much of the kind of activity which does not impede, but aids and stimulates, individual exertion and development. The mischief begins when, instead of calling forth the activities and powers of individuals and bodies, it substitutes its own activity for theirs. 4 So the proper function of government **is to facilitate, not dominate**; to **make the rules, not play the game**. By its nature, big government — whoever exercises power and whatever their intentions — is bound to be less responsive or efﬁ cient than small. In addition, any problems that emerge quickly become the rationale for further extensions of administrative power. But the more the government intrudes into the life of the citi- zenry, the more burdensome and expensive it becomes. More important, because power corrupts, it will inevitably tend to become overbearing as well. Because men and women have a surfeit of passion and a deﬁ cit of reason, a substantial degree of governance is indis- pensable for civilized life. It alone can constrain the one and supply the other. So government is a necessary evil — and the more it departs from what is truly indispensable, the greater the evil. Our aim must therefore be to construct a political regime that is sufﬁ cient to the desired end without exceeding what is strictly necessary. Instituting a necessary evil is not for the squeamish, but we shirk the task at our peril. Pascal likened political philosophy to “ lay[ing] down rules for an insane asylum. ” 5 The metaphor is apt. At best, even in comparatively well-ordered polities, political life is a kind of Bedlam characterized by shared delusion, cold-blooded self-seeking, and an aggressive will to power. At worst, it becomes a barely sublimated civil war one step removed from a Hobbesian state of nature. And Pope to the contrary notwithstanding, good rules are indeed necessary for a good politics lest we turn into a well-administered con- centration camp. Depending on the rules and the ways in which the rules are administered, the asylum will be more or less peaceful, more or less benign, and more or less conducive to individual sanity and welfare. Politics is not everywhere and always an unmitigated evil. As Aristotle and others point out, participation in politics can enhance the self-development of individuals. What is too often forgotten, however, is that only small, simple, face-to- face societies permit genuine participation. In the wrong set- ting — a society that is large, complex, or divided — **participatory politics** is likely to become what Plato said it was: an ignorant and impassioned mob **ﬁghting over the tiller of the ship** of state, with potentially disastrous consequences. The essen- tial task is therefore to foster a social and economic setting conducive to a politics that is sane, humane, participatory, and ecological. Nothing I say here should be construed as approving a dictatorial remaking of our civilization. We do not need a Lenin or even an Ataturk. We require a new moral, legal, and political order that cannot be imposed from the top down but that must instead percolate up as the consequence of an intel- lectual and moral reformation. The aim of this reformation should be to create the kind of society desired by Burke and Taine — a **self-regulating society** in which individuals bind themselves with moral chains and thereby become their own constables. To return to the theme of the noble lie, the ideal animating the machinery of government, not the machinery itself, con- stitutes a polity. Institutions do not create an ethos: witness the bootless attempts in the postcolonial era to graft the trap- pings of representative democracy onto traditional societies for whom democracy and liberty are alien ideals. The reverse is actually true: those who possess an ethos will naturally establish institutions that reﬂect it. Politics is not about elections, ofﬁces, or laws. It is about the deﬁnition of reality: what epistemology, ontology, and ethic shall constitute our rule of life? It is about the master metaphor that frames the manner of thought and the character of institutions at lower levels. At the heart of any political battle — from the general direction of society to particular policy issues — is a ﬁ ght to make a particular idea prevail: the invisible hand or the class struggle, a right to life or freedom of choice? 6 In consequence, said David Hume, it is always opinion that governs: nothing appears more surprising to those who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few. . . . When we inquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall ﬁ nd, that, as FORCE is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular. 7 The French jurist J. M. A. Servan made the same point more cynically: A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more strongly by the chain of their own ideas. . . . [T]his link is all the stronger in that we do not know what it is made of. 8 This ancient problem was adumbrated by Plato in The Republic and has been much studied in modern times by soci- ologists of knowledge: the human mind produces opinions that may have only a passing resemblance to reality. In the political arena, the problem manifests as Karl Marx ’ s “ false consciousness. ” On one side, a majority is unskilled in think- ing but hungry for meaning, and on the other, a smaller minor- ity is skilled at mental manipulation and hungry for power. The latter normally succeeds in imposing its ideas on the former — “ What luck for rulers that men do not think, ” said Adolf Hitler 9 — and these ideas, backed up as necessary by the gendarmerie and secret police, constitute the mainstay of any regime. The political dramas that occupy our newspapers and television screens **are** therefore largely **irrelevant**. As long as the basic metaphor remains the same, it is business as usual, no matter who wins elections or what policies are adopted. However, let one metaphor displace another, and “ reality ” shifts accordingly. According to Archibald MacLeish, “ A world ends when its metaphor has died. ” 10 When the consent of the governed supplanted the divine right of kings as master metaphor, the consequence was a radically new and different political order. The usual understanding of false consciousness, especially among Marxists, is that the falsity is due to cynical political manipulation combined with deliberate intellectual obfusca- tion, which leads the masses to be cunningly imprisoned in a set of beliefs that serve the interests of the ruling class. The usual solution proposed by modern thinkers is therefore sci- entiﬁ c. Science — whether the laws of dialectical materialism that govern the unfolding of human history, the best means of fostering economic growth, or the right way to feed babies — will provide objectively truthful answers to all questions and thereby liberate us from false consciousness once and for all. But there is no such thing as objectively true consciousness. Science may indeed provide us with true opinion concerning certain aspects of human nature and the natural world so that we can choose a rule of life that does not ﬂ out reality. But it cannot tell us what reality ultimately is, and it cannot choose the rule for us. **Everything** depends on the master metaphor we use to construct reality. The image of the machine leads to one kind of society — individualistic, acquisitive, exploitative — whereas the image of Gaia points in a very different direction. Again, we come face to face with the enormous power and reach of metaphor. It can liberate us, or it can enclose us in a mental prison — either one of our own making or one imposed on us by powerful others. The essential political struggle of our time is **not to pass laws that reduce pollution and conserve energy** so that the machine can keep running until it self-destructs, taking human- ity along with it. Instead, it is to ﬁght to make ecology the master science and Gaia the ruling metaphor — to abandon an ignoble lie and embrace a nobler new ﬁction that offers the means of long-term survival and the prospect of a further advance in civilization. This conclusion that a new ﬁ ction is the key to political change is supported by systems analysis. As Donella H. Meadows points out, the most effective leverage point for changing a system ’ s behavior is its fundamental mind set or paradigm, for this determines its goals, structure, and rules. 11 Unfortunately, this is also where resistance to change is ﬁ ercest. The required strategy of change, says Meadows, is to expose the anomalies, contradictions, and failures of the old paradigm while at the same time offering a new and better one. 12 The essence of the politeia that follows from this new ﬁ ction has already been stated. It is a politics of consciousness grounded in ecology and dedicated to inner cultivation instead of outer conquest. But what does this imply? The sages, prophets, poets, and philosophers who have gone against the grain of civilization by urging men and women to pursue wisdom and virtue instead of wealth and power have generally agreed on the means necessary to this end. They all envisioned a way of living that is materially and institutionally simple but culturally and spiritually rich — and therefore more generally free, egalitarian, and fraternal than life in complex societies devoted to continuous accumula- tion and expansion. The case for material and institutional simplicity takes several forms. The negative argument is that as societies grow larger and more complex, self-regulation breaks down, so they develop chronic and intractable problems. Politicians respond with laws and regulations that purport to be solutions. But when society has reached a certain level of complexity, solu- tions are either far from obvious or too painful to implement or even contemplate. Leaders resort to simplistic, merely expedient “ reforms ” that fail to solve the old problems and generate new ones that then require stronger measures. As a consequence, government grows ﬁ rst powerful, then intrusive, and ﬁ nally overbearing or even tyrannical, and the people themselves are corrupted and made dependent. Under such conditions, liberty decays, equality declines, and fraternity fades, often dramatically. The solution is for men and women to live in relatively small and simple societies that encourage them to be upright and independent, that preserve them from oppression, that keep them on a relatively equal footing with their fellow citizens, and that allow them to participate mean- ingfully in civic life. The positive argument is that men and women should live close to the earth and to each other in relatively simple and stable small communities because this is what the archetypal needs of the “ 2,000,000-year-old man ” require. A simpler and more natural existence will tend to maximize an individual ’ s chances of enjoying the good life — deﬁ ned as a way of living that is ﬁ lled with nature, beauty, family, friendship, leisure, education, and, for those inclined to it, philosophy in the Platonic sense of personal and spiritual self-development. These things, not material goods, bring true felicity. It follows that the aim of economic life must be sufﬁ ciency, which supports such felicity — not great wealth, which is its enemy. Sufﬁ ciency is also important for political reasons. Besides forestalling the growth of tyranny, a simple economy is relatively transparent, so individuals can see their own inter- ests as well as the common interest and act on them. Sufﬁ - ciency combined with ample opportunity for self-development also reconciles the tension between equality and excellence. If each human being attains his or her unique excellence and is recognized by others for having done so, then the best can in principle rule without creating either dependency or resent- ment among the ruled. This brief overview touches on important issues that are further addressed below, but we must ﬁ rst respond to the objection that a small-is-beautiful prescription for political salvation is utterly utopian and therefore not worthy of being taken seriously. In fact, what has always been philosophically commendable is about to become practically obligatory. The manifold pressures of ecological scarcity will soon compel us to live in smaller, simpler communities that are closer to the land than the megacities of industrial civilization. In the next few decades, well before we have completely exhausted the capital stocks of fossil fuels and mineral ores on which the current industrial order depends, matter and energy will become increasingly scarce and expensive. If deployed skill- fully and in a timely manner, technology can shape and moder- ate this inexorable trend, but it **cannot forestall it**. Our future way of life will of necessity be more simple, frugal, local, agricultural, diversiﬁ ed, and decentralized than at present. Our task must be to make a virtue of this necessity. When we recognize its necessity, we shall see that a simpler way of life might indeed be more virtuous and happy than the one we now believe represents the acme of human progress. In the ﬁrst place, industrial civilization has become too complex and interlinked for its own good. As Joseph Tainter points out, an excess of complexity, usually aggravated by other factors, has spelled the downfall of previous civilizations. 13 The costs of increasing complexity grow disproportionately until they eventually reach a point of diminishing or even declining returns. The civilization therefore has to run harder and harder to make further progress or even to stay in the same place. In addition, a civilization already stressed by the high costs of complexity may **no longer be resilient** enough to respond to further challenges. It risks a cascade of failure should a critical link fail for whatever reason. The interconnected insti- tutions of a highly complex society are like mountain climbers tied to one rope with no belay: the fall of one can trigger the death of all. For example, the world ﬁ nancial system experi- ences periodic crises when the failure of one bank brings down a host of counterparties. Similarly, a sudden or signiﬁ cant increase in the price of a critical commodity, such as petro- leum, can choke an industrial superstructure predicated on cheap and abundant energy. The further danger is that such a crisis can trigger psychological panic and social pandemo- nium. In short, the higher we build the ediﬁ ce of civilization, the more vulnerable we become to catastrophe. A simpler, more resilient way of life would therefore be advisable on prudential grounds alone. But our primary concern here is politeia , and the political argument for cultural simplicity is that great size and complex- ity produce a debased politics. When a polity grows beyond certain bounds, oligarchy in the bad sense is inescapable, the burden of bureaucracy grows ever more stiﬂ ing, and genuine consent of the governed is practically unattainable. A vicious circle fostering ever greater centralized planning, administra- tive intervention, and political control takes over. If democracy survives at all, it will be a token democracy shadowed by the lurking menace of mob rule. In the United States today, for instance, a tiny circulating policy elite makes all the important decisions in ways that align the interests of government, ﬁ nance, and business. Since the system is “ democratic, ” the elite has to take into account the passions of the mob, which can erupt if its ox is palpably gored. So as long as the American ruling class provides the bread of afﬂ uence and an entertaining media circus, it can do pretty much as it likes. Having long since outgrown the relatively simple conditions required to support its constitu- tional design, the United States has therefore become an impe- rial polity bearing no resemblance whatsoever to the original American republic. Such is the political price of great size and complexity. To cast the problem in more philosophical terms, let us turn to Jean-Jacques Rousseau ’ s On the Social Contract , which argues that the central task of politics is to uphold the “ general will. ” This is what any reasonable person, putting aside his or her prejudice and self-interest, would agree is in the public interest because it beneﬁ ts the community as a whole. Rousseau contrasts the general will with the “ will of all, ” which is the mere summation of all the private wills of the individuals composing the polity. The difference between the general will and the will of all is best seen through examples. If people are carrying a contagious disease, the general will may demand that they be quarantined in some fashion. We do not allow a Typhoid Mary to work in restaurants because preventing the spread of illness to the general population trumps her loss of liberty. Similarly, we do not permit individuals to urinate and defecate just anywhere. We oblige them to practice good hygiene by using sanitary facilities, both to prevent a public nuisance and to preserve public health. We also make immunization mandatory for schoolchildren because we know that the gain to society from herd immunity outweighs not only parental preference but even the slight risk of harm to any particular child. In this critical area of public health, we compel individuals to follow the general will rather than their private will because to do otherwise would produce a diseased will of all. In these cases, the difference between the general will and the will of all is clear, and the argument for the former is, to most people, compelling. However, this same dynamic applies at every level within the polity — albeit usually in a more atten- uated form that can make it hard to achieve or even discern the general will, especially in advance. As Rousseau points out, “ One always wants what is good for oneself, but one does not always see it. ” 14 Even where there is no evil intention but simply **the natural urge to fulﬁll individual desire**, people following their private will almost always create a will of all contrary to the general will. For example, the individual preference for private automo- biles leads to a host of public ills — trafﬁ c-choked and polluted cities that are friendlier to cars than people, thousands of dead and injured people every year, the threat of climate disruption, the loss of good farmland to suburban sprawl, foreign policy dilemmas or even wars, and so forth. Similarly, private demand for exotic woods causes the destruction of tropical rainforests, an ecological tragedy whose costs we all bear. Likewise, indi- viduals seeking longer life through state-of-the-art medical care threaten to bankrupt the public purse, to mention only the ﬁ scal cost of extended life spans. In other words, perfectly reasonable and legitimate private desires and actions aggregate into global outcomes that no reasonable person would want. Unless the general will is identiﬁ ed and upheld by the polity, ill-advised microdecisions motivated by private interest will add up to an unwanted or even ruinous macrodecision. The “ tragedy of the commons, ” the “ public-goods problem, ” the phenomenon of “ market failure, ” and a number of other dilemmas much studied by contemporary social sci- entists are instances of the general problem identiﬁ ed by Rous- seau. The same essential conﬂ ict occurs within each individual human being. We all know we would be healthier if we ate less and exercised more (the general will), but instead we indulge appetite (the private will) and cause an epidemic of obesity (the will of all). As a matter of both principle and practice, modern political economies are based explicitly on the will of all — that is, they are designed to satisfy private desire, not to achieve the public good. To put it the other way around, the public good has been redeﬁ ned as the outcome of the invisible hand of the economic and political marketplace. In fact, any attempt to uphold the commonweal is likely to be dismissed out of hand as special pleading or denounced as hostile to liberty. The practical outcome of modern political economy is almost bound to be what economist John Kenneth Galbraith called “ private afﬂ u- ence and public squalor ” — that is, a state in which individuals gratify their petty desires without regard to the unwanted or even destructive consequences of their private acts. 15 Worse yet, the reality of any marketplace is that partici- pants constantly strive to tip the invisible hand in their dir- ection, so the legislative process is likely to be subverted. As Rousseau put it, “ the basest interest brazenly adopts the sacred name of the public good . . . and iniquitous decrees whose only goal is the private interest are falsely passed under the name of laws. ” 16 The resulting will of all is therefore not pure but crooked. It has been bent to favor some interests over others. For Rousseau, the will of all is not primarily a practical problem to be solved but a moral failure to be overcome. When we follow our private will oblivious to or even in deﬁ ance of the general will, we injure society and degrade ourselves. His conclusion is expressed in stark terms by the epigraph to this chapter: since “ the impulse of appetite alone is slavery, ” we must be “ forced to be free ” by being made obedient to laws that align our private wills with the general will. Rousseau attempts to reconcile the obvious conﬂ ict between individual liberty and the higher freedom we gain in following the general will by saying that we are obeying laws that we, as reasonable beings, have prescribed for ourselves. But he acknowledges that the problem is like squaring the circle — ultimately unsolvable. As Rousseau says, it is simply a given of the human condition that “ the private will acts incessantly against the general will, ” so it is inconceivable that the two will ever be perfectly aligned. 17 But there is an approximate solution for squaring the politi- cal circle: by simplifying the setting of politics, we can make the private will and the general will coincide to a much greater degree than they do in large and complex societies. Rousseau ’ s political ideal is a gathering of peasants deciding their simple affairs under an oak tree. The smaller and simpler the polity, the more likely it is that those deciding will understand the issues, see what would best serve their mutual interest, and choose to implement this collective decision even if it does not fully satisfy their private preferences. There is an almost mathematical relationship: the further away a society is from Rousseau ’ s ideal, the less apparent or compelling the general will is to any given individual, and the greater the likelihood of the polity ’ s lapsing into an undesirable will of all. In short, if you want to achieve a rough approximation of the general will, make your polity small and simple. It follows that the setting of politics is crucial. Rousseau does not want a totalitarian reign of virtue, as some critics allege. He uses the doctrine of the general will not to justify authoritarianism but to show why it is necessary to establish social conditions that give rise to a natural reign of virtue. Unless the polity is relatively small and simple, the doctrine of the general will can be perverted to legitimate the tyranny of a majority or the dictatorship of a central committee — precisely what happened during and after the French Revolution. Rousseau ’ s “ law one has prescribed for oneself ” is not a statute law to be enforced by the authorities but a moral law that embodies the general will. This makes mores the sine qua non of a good politics. Unless the moral law is given concrete form, individuals will tend to go their own way without regard to the general will. Mores, says Rousseau, are the “ unshakeable keystone ” of politics. 18 Unfortunately, in large, complex, impersonal societies beyond any person ’ s ken or control, the temptation to ignore or ﬂ out the mores of the community becomes overwhelming. Only a relatively small, face-to-face community can exert suf- ﬁ cient moral pressure to make individuals consistently obedi- ent to the mores that force them to be “ free. ” If you want citizens to be upright and law-abiding, make your polity small and simple. Last but far from least, freedom for Rousseau is not the ability to gratify appetite but the absence of dependence. As he says in É mile , There are two sorts of dependence: dependence on things, which is from nature; dependence on men, which is from society. Dependence on things, since it has no morality, is in no way detrimental to freedom and engenders no vices. Dependence on men, since it is without order [i.e., it is morally degrading], engenders all the vices, and by it, master and slave are mutually corrupted. 19 In other words, a large, wealthy, complex, hierarchical social order reduces the vast majority to a state of dependence and therefore destroys freedom. So if you want citizens instead of slaves, make your polity small and simple. Rousseau ’ s doctrines may sound shockingly “ illiberal ” to the contemporary ear, but consider John Locke ’ s discussion of freedom: The Freedom then of Man and Liberty of acting according to his own Will, is grounded on his having Reason , which is able to instruct him in that Law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will. To turn him loose to an unrestrain ’ d Liberty, before he has Reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of his Nature, to be free; but to thrust him out amongst Brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much beneath that of a Man, as theirs. 20 So even the author of the liberal tradition says that freedom is not “ an unrestrain ’ d Liberty. ” Despite their considerable differences, Locke and Rousseau therefore agree on this fun- damental point: man ’ s private will must be made subject to “ that Law he is to govern himself by, ” a law discovered by “ Reason. ” To frame the issue in terms of Burke ’ s syllogism, if we do not bind ourselves with moral chains, then others will do the job for us (and not necessarily to our advantage). There must be a structure of benign control to teach self-control — in other words, community mores. Locke, who made a strong civil society the linchpin of his political theory, therefore differs only in degree with Plato, Rousseau, and others (such as the psychologist B. F. Skinner) who contend that since social con- ditioning is already pervasive and controls human behavior unconsciously, we must strive to do it more consciously, com- passionately, and responsibly. It also should be said that neither Locke nor Adam Smith would approve of the ends to which their liberal doctrines have been perverted. Both are actually closer in spirit to Rousseau than to contemporary liberals because they envisaged small-hold, independent pro- prietors enjoying strong but limited property rights, not gar- gantuan, globe-straddling corporations exploiting the same rights to dominate both economy and polity.

### Case

#### Neoliberalism is a term that has been co-opted by the left – allowing countries to have and respond to economic incentives solves poverty – we control global uniqueness and turn their Santos evidence

**Worstall 10** [Tim, “More on this neo-liberalism thing”, Adam Smith Institute, March 7] //khirn

Neo-liberalism gets blamed for a lot of things: that bankers couldn't see a housing bubble for example. It's also been said that the insistence that the poor countries of the world do the same things to get rich that we did to get rich - trade, get governments out of the way, try to create wealth, these sorts of things - was neo-liberalism conspiring to keep them poor. As we all know, China moved marketwards from a near insane communism and has been growing explosively since. India moved marketwards from a near insane Fabianism and has been growing explosively since....but what about Africa? It would be fair to say that this neo-liberalism thing got there a little later. Mid 1990s sounds about right, so, how's it been [working](http://www.columbia.edu/%7Exs23/papers/pdfs/Africa_Paper_VX3.2.pdf)? The conventional wisdom that Africa is not reducing poverty is wrong..... we estimate income distributions, poverty rates, and inequality and welfare indices for African countries for the period 1970‐2006. We show that: African poverty is falling and is falling rapidly. .... The growth spurt that began in 1995 decreased African income inequality instead of increasing it.  African poverty reduction is remarkably general: it cannot be explained by a large country, or even by a single set of countries possessing some beneficial geographical or historical characteristic. All classes of countries, including those with disadvantageous geography and history, experience reductions in poverty. In particular, poverty fell for both landlocked as well as coastal countries; for mineral‐rich as well as mineral‐poor countries; for countries with favorable or with unfavorable agriculture; for countries regardless of colonial origin; and for countries with below‐ or above median slave exports per capita during the African slave trade. How amazing: our melanin enhanced brethren are indeed our brethren, they react to and take advantage of economic incentives just as we do. Allowed the freedom to create, innovate and create wealth, wealth they create. Whatever ordure dumped upon them from that great height in the past by near insane economic policies and the thugs and crooks that have ruled them, peace, easy taxes and the tolerable administration of justice have been doing their thing. Or as those desiring that near a billion people escape poverty and join us in enjoying the fruits of the bourgeois lifestyle should perhaps be saying, neo-liberalism is dead: long live neo-liberalism.

#### They can’t solve neoliberalism – the forms of education in Giroux’s social state will become complicit with privatization and militarism

**Vincent 6** [[Jonathan Vincent](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/pedagogy/v006/6.1vincent.html#top) is a PhD candidate in American studies at the University of Illinois, where he teaches American literature and composition. “A Call to Arms in a Repressive Atmosphere of Educational Acquiescence”, Pedagogy 6.1 (2006) 189-198, JSTOR

While the thought of resuscitating a more multicultural orientation in the face of global political instability might resonate with many who feel alienated by the current clamor of mindless patriotism and national fantasy, I hesitate at what seems a strangely familiar rhetoric and an unflinching recapitulation to the old binaries of state and subject. The advance of conservative thinking and policy that the Girouxs identify has occurred in tandem with precisely the kinds of educational advances to which the authors imagine a therapeutic return. The corporate-congressional-military-industrial complex has developed simultaneously with the creation of cultural studies, women's studies, multicultural ethnic/race studies, and queer theory as academic disciplines. Indeed, much of the Girouxs' book labors to demonstrate that the kind of education they want "back" has only been in practice in certain aberrant "utopian" moments—ancient Greece and the United States of the 1960s. While the inspiring élan of their clarion call to "challenge" the encroaching capitalist monstrosity might invigorate a depleted sense of hope in a depressed and frustrated, "post–November 2" academic milieu, many educators are contending that the hegemonic saturation of our public spheres is already too structurally suffused by market forces and militarism to leave much room for either renovation or revolt. Such "cynicism" is a demon that the Girouxs want badly to exorcise, but we might want to consider the way that cultural studies has been complicit with certain forms of neoliberal capitalism through its emphasis on tolerance as a good in and of itself and its production of multicultural identities as new market commodities.

#### the affirmatives struggle against neoliberalism decides the fate of capitalism—it opens the door for a socialist government

**Kotz, economics prof, 3—**Professor of Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst (David, Socialism and Global Neoliberal Capitalism, http://www.nodo50.org/cubasigloXXI/congreso/kotz\_10abr03.pdf)

We seem to be at the start of a new period of **major struggle** against capitalism, after a long time of relative quiescence and relatively unimpeded action by those constructing the global neoliberal order. Will the new movement now in formation turn out to be a force for another wave of major reform in capitalism, or rather might it lead to the replacement of capitalism by socialism? Advocates of both aims are present in the leadership of this new movement, although the masses of participants are, at this time, undoubtedly largely of reformist inclination. Is it possible that this movement will turn into a force for radical transformation of the world? 19. The above analysis of a vision of socialism and of the contemporary stage of neoliberal capitalism suggest three preconditions for the development of a powerful socialist movement in the current conditions. First, the various movements against the particular ills inflicted by global neoliberal capitalism would have to be **transform**ed **into battles** over the power to determine how economic resources are used. This would represent a direct challenge to the disempowering of popular groups by neoliberal restructuring. The various particular opposition movements can be thought of as representing, in embryo, the democratic participatory socialism of the future, in which popular groups will make economic decisions. Socialists within these movements should struggle for the principle of the right of popular groups to make the economic decisions that affect them. In this way, socialism can be **made real to the participants** in those movements, although socialism cannot finally and fully be installed without making a radical break with current property relations and the current allocation of political power. 20. Second, there is a need for mass education about the ways in which capitalism lies at the root of the problems afflicting ordinary people around the world. That is, the anti capitalist consciousness that has already developed in many social movements would have to spread to a much wider audience. For example, it can be pointed out that the aggressive war launched by the US and British Governments against Iraq is not just the result of a cowboy US president from Texas. This war has deeper sources in the tendency of powerful capitalist states to assert control over as much of the world as possible, in order to gain control over raw materials, as well as to assure markets for exports and obtain cheap labor. 21. Third, the belief that nothing beyond capitalism is possible can be countered by projecting a vision of a workable socialism, based on popular democratic participation in the economic as well as the political institutions of society. The socialist movement can be rebuilt, and socialism can become a real possibility again, only when millions of people become convinced, not only that capitalism does not meet their needs, but that a qualitatively superior alternative system is possible. 22. Most people will not easily pass beyond the fight for social reform to adopt a position in favor of the radical step of replacing capitalism entirely. After all, a fundamental social transformation inevitably entails high costs and many sacrifices. Masses of people will consider such change only if they become convinced that the existing system cannot be reformed so as to make it tolerable. There is no way to be certain that capitalism, if confronted with a powerful and growing socialist movement, will not switch over to a more benign, regulated form once again. However, it appears to be a feature of global neoliberal capitalism that it doggedly resists any effort to soften or modify its hard edges. The tenacity and determination of the current rulers of world capitalism in their effort to impose the inhuman global neoliberal form of capitalism on the world may turn out to be their undoing. **If the resistance** to reform on the part of global neoliberal capitalism **persists**, Karl **Marx’s vision** of a socialist future for humankind may again be placed on the world’s political agenda.

#### Capitalism is key to space exploration and development

**Blundell**, director general of the Institute for Economic Affairs, **2004** (John, “Mission to Mars must go private to succeed,” February 2, http://www.iea.org.uk/record.jsp?type=news&ID=166)

Bush is not finding the billions himself. Rather the tab will be picked up by US taxpayers in perhaps 20 years’ time. What arrests me is the unchallenged assumption that space exploration must be a nationalised industry. The Soviet effort may be stalled but the Chinese seem committed to joining the race. The European Space Agency is a strange combination of nationalised bodies. NASA is a pure old-fashioned nationalised entity. I argue we should relinquish the expectation that space has to be limited to vast quangos. The mindset we all share is an echo of the rivalry between the evaporated USSR and the still dynamic US. The first bleeps of the Sputnik galvanised the US into accelerating its space effort. What we need is capitalists in space. Capitalism needs property rights, enforcement of contracts and the rule of law. The ideological tussle does not cease once we are beyond the ionosphere. With the exception of Arthur C Clarke, none of us imagined the entertainment potential from satellites. Geostationary lumps of electronic gadgetry beam us our BSkyB television pictures. I remain in awe that Rupert Murdoch can place a device in the skies above Brazil that sends a signal to every home in each hemisphere. Who could have foreseen that mobile phones could keep us chattering without any wiring, or that global position techniques could plot where we all are to within a metre? These are business applications. Business is already in space. Markets detect and apply opportunities that are not envisaged by even the most accomplished technicians. I’m not saying Murdoch has special competences. I imagine he is as baffled by digital miracles as I am. The point is that companies define and refine what public bodies cannot achieve. Lift the veil of course and all those satellite firms are an intricate web of experts supplying ideas and services. We have an infant space market. What use will the Moon be? Is there value on Mars other than the TV rights? The answer is nobody can know. We can only make some guesses. The Spanish ships that set off for the US thought they would get to India. The Portuguese knew they’d reach China. The English followed them westwards seeking gold. In fact, they got tobacco. Events always confound expectations. The arguments for putting men on Mars are expressly vague from President Bush. Perhaps he was really bidding for votes. From my reading the best results may be medical. Zero, or low, gravity techniques may allow therapies of which we are ignorant. It seems facetious to suggest tourism may be a big part of space opportunity but as both the North and South poles are over-populated and there is a queue at the top of Mount Everest, a trip to the Sea of Tranquility may prove a magnet for the wealthy. Instead of NASA’s grotesque bureaucracy it may be Thomas Cook will be a greater force for exploration. NASA could be a procurement body. It need not design and run all space ventures. It could sub-contract far more extensively. Without specialised engineering expertise it is not easy to criticise projects such as the shuttle. It seems to be excessively costly and far too fragile. There are private space entrepreneurs already. They are tiddlers up against the mighty NASA. Yet Dan Goldin, the NASA leader, says he favours the privatisation of space: "We can’t afford to do solar system exploration until we turn these activities over to the cutting edge private sector..."Some may say that commercialising portions of NASA’s functions is heresy. Others may think we are taking a path that will ruin the wonders of space. I believe that when NASA can creatively partner, all of humankind will reap the benefits of access to open space". Is it possible the Moon has a more noble future than merely a branch office of NASA? Is it tolerable that Mars could be a subsidiary of the USA? Could it be nominally a further state of the union? These are not silly questions. In time space will be defined by lawyers and accountants as property rights will need to be deliberated. One possibility may be that both environments are so hostile that Mars and the Moon will never be more than token pockets for humanity. On the evidence so far it is the orbiting satellites that have made us see the Earth through new eyes. We can survey and explore the planet better from 200 miles up than stomping on the surface. The emerging commercial body of space law is derived from telecommunications law. It is perplexing and contrary to our immediate senses. How can you own or exchange something as intangible as digital messages bouncing off satellites? Yet we all pay our mobile phone bills. Many of the business results of space exploration are unintended consequences of NASA’s early adventures. Computer development would probably have been slower but for the need for instrumentation for Apollo. Are there prospects for Scottish firms in space? The prizes will not go to only the mega corporations. Perhaps Dobbies, the Edinburgh garden centre group, can create new roses by placing pots beyond gravity. Edinburgh University laboratories, or rather their commercial spin offs, could patent new medicines. Is it possible the genetic magicians at the Bush could hitch a ride into space and extend their discoveries? NASA is a monopolist. All monopolies are bad for business. They only stunt opportunities. They blunt alternatives. By opening space to entrepreneurship we will be starting on what FA Hayek memorably describes as "a discovery procedure". Science is an open system. So is capitalism.

#### Space solves multiple existential threats – the program is key to survival

**Pelton in ’03** (Joseph, Director of the Space and Advanced Communications Research institute at George Washington University and Executive Director of the Arthur C. Clarke Foundation, “COMMENTARY: Why Space? The Top 10 Reasons”, September 23, http://www.space.com/news/commentary\_top10\_030912.html)

Actually the lack of a space program could get us all killed. I dont mean you or me or my wife or children. I mean that Homo sapiens as a species are actually endangered. Surprising to some, a well conceived space program may well be our only hope for long-term survival. The right or wrong decisions about space research and exploration may be key to the futures of our grandchildren or great-grandchildren or those that follow. Arthur C. Clarke, the author and screenplay writer for 2001: A Space Odyssey, put the issue rather starkly some years back when he said: The dinosaurs are not around today because they did not have a space program. He was, of course, referring to the fact that we now know a quite largish meteor crashed into the earth, released poisonous Iridium chemicals into our atmosphere and created a killer cloud above the Earth that blocked out the sun for a prolonged period of time. This could have been foreseen and averted with a sufficiently advanced space program. But this is only one example of how space programs, such as NASAs Spaceguard program, help protect our fragile planet. Without a space program we would not know about the large ozone hole in our atmosphere, the hazards of solar radiation, the path of killer hurricanes or many other environmental dangers. But this is only a fraction of the ways that space programs are crucial to our future. He Continues… Protection against catastrophic planetary accidents: It is easy to assume that an erratic meteor or comet will not bring destruction to the Earth because the probabilities are low. The truth is we are bombarded from space daily. The dangers are greatest not from a cataclysmic collision, but from not knowing enough about solar storms, cosmic radiation and the ozone layer. An enhanced Spaceguard Program is actually a prudent course that could save our species in time.

#### Ending capitalism dooms artificial intelligence

**Kurzweil 1**

Ray Kurzweil, Ph.D. and Genius Inventor, “The Law of Accelerating Returns”, Lifeboat Foundation Special Reports, 2001, http://lifeboat.com/ex/law.of.accelerating.returns

There is a vital economic imperative to create more intelligent technology. Intelligent machines have enormous value. That is why they are being built. There are tens of thousands of projects that are advancing intelligent machines in diverse incremental ways. The support for "high tech" in the business community (mostly software) has grown enormously. When I started my optical character recognition (OCR) and speech synthesis company (Kurzweil Computer Products, Inc.) in 1974, there were only a half-dozen high technology IPO's that year. The number of such deals has increased one hundred fold and the number of dollars invested has increased by more than one thousand fold in the past 25 years. In the four years between 1995 and 1999 alone, high tech venture capital deals increased from just over $1 billion to approximately $15 billion. We will continue to build more powerful computational mechanisms because it creates enormous value. We will reverse-engineer the human brain not simply because it is our destiny, but because there is valuable information to be found there that will provide insights in building more intelligent (and more valuable) machines. We would have to repeal capitalism and every visage of economic competition to stop this progression.

#### Extinction

**Bostrum 03**

(Nick, Director, Oxford Future of Humanity Institute, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/ai.htm)

It is hard to think of any problem that a superintelligence could not either solve or at least help us solve. Disease, poverty, environmental destruction, unnecessary suffering of all kinds: these are things that a superintelligence equipped with advanced nanotechnology would be capable of eliminating. Additionally, a superintelligence could give us indefinite lifespan, either by stopping and reversing the aging process through the use of nanomedicine[7], or by offering us the option to upload ourselves. A superintelligence could also create opportunities for us to vastly increase our own intellectual and emotional capabilities, and it could assist us in creating a highly appealing experiential world in which we could live lives devoted to in joyful game-playing, relating to each other, experiencing, personal growth, and to living closer to our ideals.

#### A. Socializing agriculture collapses food production

Thomas **Sowell**, senior fellow Hoover Institution, 1/2/**02**

(Capitalism Magazine From Marxism to the Market, http://capmag.com/article.asp?ID=1331)

The rhetoric of **socialism** may be inspiring, but its actual record **is dismal**. Countries which for centuries exported food have suddenly found themselves forced to import food **to stave off starvation**, after agriculture was socialized. This has happened all over the world, among people of every race. Anyone who saw the contrast between East Berlin and West Berlin, back in the days when half the city was controlled by the Communists, can have no doubts as to which system produces more economic benefits for ordinary people. Even though the people in both parts of the city were of the same race, culture and history, those living under the Communists were painfully poorer, in addition to having less freedom. Much the same story could be told in Africa, where Ghana relied on socialistic programs and the Ivory Coast relied more on the marketplace, after both countries became independent back in the 1960s. Ghana started off with all the advantages. Its per capita income was double that of the Ivory Coast. But, after a couple of decades under different economic systems, the bottom 20% of people in the Ivory Coast had higher incomes than 60% of the people in Ghana.

#### B. A fall in food production causes world war three

William H **Calvin 2002** (University of Washington, A Brain for All Season, http://WilliamCalvin.com/BrainForAllSeasons/ NAcoast.htm Caporal)

The population-crash scenario is surely the most appalling. Plummeting crop yields will cause some powerful countries to try to take over their neighbors or distant lands – if only because their armies, unpaid and lacking food, will go marauding, both at home and across the borders. The better-organized countries will attempt to use their armies, before they fall apart entirely, to take over countries with significant remaining resources, driving out or starving their inhabitants if not using modern weapons to accomplish the same end: eliminating competitors for the remaining food. **This will be a worldwide problem – and could easily lead to a Third World War** – but Europe's vulnerability is particularly easy to analyze.

#### Commodification arguments are wrong---policy solutions are the only way to prevent extinction

Wagner 11 Gernot, economist at EDF, where he works in the office of economic policy and analysis, “But Will the Planet Notice? How Smart Economics Can Save the World.” Hill and Wang Press, p. 11-12

The fundamental forces guiding the behavior of billions are much larger than any one of us. It's about changing our system, creating a new business as usual. And to do that we need to think about what makes our system run. In the end, it comes down to markets, and the rules of the game that govern what we chase and how we chase it. Scientists can tell us how bad it will get. Activists can make us pay attention to the ensuing instabilities and make politicians take note. When the task comes to formulating policy, only economists can help guide us out of this morass and save the planet. In an earlier time with simpler problems, environmentalists took direct action against the market's brutal forces by erecting roadblocks or chaining themselves to trees. That works if the opposing force is a lumberjack with a chain saw. It might even work for an entire industry when the task is to ban a particular chemical or scrub a pollutant out of smokestacks. But that model breaks down when the opposing force is ourselves: each and every one of us demanding that the globalized market provide us with cheaper and better food, clothes, and vacations. There is no blocking the full, collective desires of the billions who are now part of the market economy and the billions more who want to—and ought to—be part of it. The only solution is to guide all-powerful market forces in the right direction and create incentives for each of us to make choices that work for all of us. The guideposts we have today for market forces evolved helter- skelter from a historical process that gave almost no weight to the survival of the planet, largely because the survival of the planet was not at stake. Now it is. Since we can't live without market forces, we need to guide them to help us keep the human adventure going in workable ways, rather than continue on the present path right off the edge of a cliff.

#### Rational argumentation key to problem-solving --- it’s the foundation for ameliorating all social and political crises

Robert C. Rowland 95 is a Professor of Communication at the University of Kansas, “In Defense of Rational Argument: A Pragmatic Justification of Argumentation Theory and Response to the Postmodern Critique” Philosophy & Rhetoric Vol. 28, No. 4Oct 1, 1995, EBSCO

Conclusion—argument and empowerment

Discursive reason and argument as a means of attaining rationality are under strong attack. When viewed from a pragmatic perspective, however, rational argument is easily defended. All aspects of a theory of argument can be tied to a rational problem-solving purpose. Field-invariant and field-dependent standards for evaluation, particular field practices, and the very defining characteristics of argument itself all are shaped by purpose. Defined in this manner, rational argument is the most useful general problem-solving tool available to humans.

Modernism was based on optimistic assumptions about what it means to be human. These assumptions related to the perfectibility of knowledge and the possibility of progress toward a truly free and just society. Today, the modernist agenda stands in tatters. We no longer believe that perfect knowledge is possible or that human civilization necessarily will progress toward greater freedom and justice. A pragmatic theory of argument cannot be used to rebuild modernism, but the tools provided by that theory can be used by each of us to further the aims of modernism. If full knowledge is unattainable, a focus on pragmatically justifiable problem-solving tools can help us to find the most effective solutions for any given problem. If no perfect society can be created, then we may use argument to ameliorate societal problems. And if social structures sometimes oppress the individual, then each of us may use argument as a tool for personal empowerment.

#### Techno-optimism and skepticism can coexist – rejecting optimism dooms the developing world to poverty and starvation

Schafer 9 [Arthur Schafer, Director of the Centre for Professional and Applied Ethics, University of Manitoba, Jan 1 2009, Review of *The End of Ethics In A Technological Society,* http://umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/departments/philosophy/ethics/media/End\_of\_Ethics\_In\_A\_Technological\_Society.pdf]

These rival tropes – white-coated saviour vs. white-coated villain - might be classified, respectively, as technophiliac and technophobiac. The technophiles berate the technophobes for being mired in the stagnant past; the technophobes accuse the technophiles of putting at risk everything we hold dear.¶ It would be misleading, however, to think of these warring camps as comprising two entirely distinct groups of people. It would be misleading because the battle of competing images is often internal rather than external. Each of us feels hopeful and optimistic some of the time, attracted by the vision of a better world through better technology. At other times, we feel fearful that efforts to achieve mastery over both Nature and human nature will produce a catastrophic result that no one could desire. In our anxious moments we remember the ancient Greek warning that Hubris is inevitably followed by Nemesis. When we are feeling hopeful, however, we imagine a world in which the ancient scourges of poverty and disease have been banished by modern technology or at least a world in which fewer of our fellow human beings suffer unremittingly.¶ Ours is a society marked by general affluence, in a world marked by general poverty. Despite the shameful existence of a sizeable minority of our own citizens which continues to live in abject poverty, we are proud of the fact that per capita income (adjusted for inflation) has been doubling roughly every generation over a period of almost two centuries. In other parts of the world, notably China and India, hundreds of millions of people have recently made the great leap from starvation to poverty and they have done so by following a technology-dependent path similar to ours. Many hope that their next leap will be from poverty to comfort and then onwards and upwards to Western-style luxury. Our exhortations - that they seek a more modest path to development, so as to spare the global environment from further (possibly fatal) damage - strike many in the developing world as hypocritical. Billions of Chinese and Indians, after all, remain mired in poverty, as do billions of others in Africa and South America.¶ Scientific discovery and technological innovation are indisputably making an important contribution to growing prosperity, thereby providing evidence for the claim that life goes better in a technological society. As Francis Bacon famously remarked, “knowledge is power”. Bacon was writing at the end of the 16th century, but his aphorism presciently captures the spirit of the 18 th century European Enlightenment. A century later, faith in the liberating power of scientific knowledge was echoed and amplified by such otherwise disparate 19th century thinkers as the liberal John Stuart Mill and the socialist Karl Marx. Mill and Marx share a striking confidence that civilizations progress through the advancement of scientific knowledge. Both believe in Progress (with a capital “P) and both insist that modern science is critically important if humankind is to ameliorate such evils as disease and starvation. Equally important, Mill and Marx share the conviction that scientific thinking will, more or less rapidly, transform modern men and women into well-educated, reasonable, and tolerant citizens. Ignorance, irrationality, superstition and intolerance (all associated with traditional religious faith) may never be totally abolished but they will surely yield, over time, to the Enlightenment forces of science and reason.

#### Life comes first ----- the catastrophic is a *distinct* concept

**Fried ’94** (Charles Fried “Rights and Wrongs as Absolute.” Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics. , p. 76. Ed. Haber 1994)

Even within such boundaries we can imagine extreme cases where killing an innocent person may save a whole nation. In such cases it seems fanatical to maintain the absoluteness of the judgment, to do right even if the heavens will in fact fall. And so **the catastrophic** may cause the absoluteness of right and wrong **to yield**, but even then it would be a non sequitur to argue (as consequentialists are fond of doing) that this proves that judgments of right and wrong are always a matter of degree, depending on the relative goods to be attained and harms to be avoided. I believe, on the contrary, that the concept of the catastrophic is a distinct concept just because it identifies the extreme **situations** in which the usual categories of judgment (including the category of right and wrong) **no longer apply**. At the other end of the spectrum, there is the concept of the trivial, the de minimis where the absolute categories do not yet apply. And the trivial also does not prove that right and wrong are really only a matter of degree. It is because of these complexities and because the term absolute is really only suggestive of a more complex structure, that I also refer to the norms of right and wrong not as absolute but as categorical.

#### Life comes first ----- value to life is biologically tied

BERNSTEIN ‘2 (Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)

**There is a basic value inherent in organic being**, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life" (IR 81). 15 "The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics. Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human action so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." We need, Jonas argued, a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "**Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth"; or again turned positive:** "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will." (IR 11)

#### Prior questions fail

Owen 2 [David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7]

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

## 2NC

#### This selfishness makes all impacts inevitable---- vote neg if we prove liberation is the root cause

**Ophuls,** member of the U.S. Foreign Service and has taught political science at Northwestern University. He is the author of Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity, which won the International Studies Association’s Sprout Prize and the American Political Science Association’s Kammerer Award, **1997**  **[**William, *Requiem for Modern Politics*]

In the end, therefore, not only did the Enlightenment paradigm of politics fail to achieve many of its avowed goals--for example, equality (at least to the extent hoped)--but it also inflicted a wanton destruction on the world, becoming thereby both its own worst enemy and the author of new forms and possibilities of tyranny undreamt of by ancient despots. Everything that does not work, all that we hate and fear about the modern way of life, is the logical or even foreordained consequence of the basic principles we have chosen to embrace. Explosive population growth, widespread habitat destruction, disastrous pollution, and every other aspect of ecological devastation; increasing crime and violence, runaway addictions of every kind, the neglect or abuse of children, and every other form of social breakdown; antinomianism, nihilism, millenarianism, and every other variety of ideological madness; hyperpluralism, factionalism, administrative despotism, and every other manifestation of democratic decay; weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, the structural poverty of underdevelopment, and many other global pathologies--all are deeply rooted in Hobbesian politics, whose basic principles set up a vicious circle of power seeking and self-destruction. In other words, the most intractable problems of our age are due not to human nature itself but, instead, to the way in which the Enlightenment in general and Hobbesian politics in particular have encouraged the worst tendencies of human nature to flourish in the modern era.

#### Turns case – delayed transition to Authoritarian regime genocides those economically disadvantaged

**Hanson**, civil engineer from Hawaii, a retired systems analyst, **2003** [Jay, “Jay Hanson: Interview,” by Scott Meredith, 6-21-2003, <http://www.wordwright.com.au/paul/HansonSummingUpInterview.htm>]

Q: I have often felt that people have misunderstood the structural essentials of the doom that you foresee. Many people seem to grasp a simple idea of “Depletion = Die off”, assuming you mean that we’ll simply freeze in the dark, and they react with approval or dismissal, depending on their politics, as usual. But what you say is more articulated than that. You actually posit a two-stage process. First, economic trainwreck triggered by, not the final stages of depletion, but by the Oil Peak itself, followed by, Second, horrendous wars fought by the great powers desperately hoping to secure the final precious reserves to themselves. This second stage would culminate in a horrific inversion, whereby “global elites” will decide to directly immolate the vast hordes of poor, ignorant, “useless eaters” of the world, via some kind of bio-weapon. In other words, not so much a “Die off” but rather a “Kill off”. Is this sketch of your analysis roughly correct? A: Your snapshot is essentially correct. But a great deal of death will occur because food and water supply lines will collapse. Food cannot be grown in anything like the quantities we need without oil and natural gas. Moreover, neither food nor water can be delivered without oil and gas. Cities like Las Vegas must become uninhabitable deserts again. The population of Southern California must fall to a few hundred thousand again. In Canada, water pipes will freeze in the winter without gas. It’s a very long list, I can’t guess how many will die from each. Q: Do you buy into conspiracy theories that posit various organizational mechanisms as the likely planners and implementers of a big “Kill-off” (e.g. Illuminati, Skull & Bones, Masons, Bilderberg, etc.)? Or, do you assume that the existing governments, or the US government alone, would be sufficient to straight-forwardly implement the “Kill-off”? A: I don’t think it matters. At any future point in time when people feel threatened, when the ruling elite is threatened, when the mob is at the gates, they’ll find a way to protect themselves. The details are not important. But that’s what I would do if I were them – get rid of them, kill them all. You have to remember, it’s like playing golf as far as the genes are concerned. It’s that easy. America is the best place to ride out the coming crash because it has the best “means of control” to keep public order and protect us from intruders.

#### The ecological crunch is coming---overwhelming scientific evidence proves an impending environmental crisis risks extinction

David Shearman 7, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC; and Joseph Wayne Smith, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism, 2007, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, p. 4-6

This impending crisis is caused by the accelerating damage to the natural environment on which humans depend for their survival. This is not to deny that there are other means that may bring catastrophe upon the earth. John Gray for example5 argues that destructive war is inevitable as nations become locked into the struggle for diminishing resources. Indeed, Gray believes that war is caused by the same instinctual behavior that we discuss in relation to environmental destruction. Gray regards population increases, environmental degradation, and misuse of technology as part of the inevitability of war. War may be inevitable but it is unpredictable in time and place, whereas environmental degradation is relentless and has progressively received increasing scientific evidence. Humanity has a record of doomsayers, most invariably wrong, which has brought a justifiable immunity to their utterances. Warnings were present in The Tales of Ovid and in the Old and New Testaments of the Bible, and in more recent times some of the predictions from Thomas Malthus and from the Club of Rome in 1972, together with the “population bomb” of Paul Ehrlich, have not eventuated. The frequent apocalyptic predictions from the environmental movement are unpopular and have been vigorously attacked. So it must be asked, what is different about the present warnings? As one example, when Sir David King, chief scientist of the UK government, states that “in my view, climate change is the most severe problem that we are facing today, more serious than the threat of terrorism,”6 how is this and other recent statements different from previous discredited prognostications? Firstly, they are based on the most detailed and compelling science produced with the same scientific rigor that has seen humans travel to the moon and create worldwide communication systems. Secondly, this science embraces a range of disciplines of ecology, epidemiology, climatology, marine and fresh water science, agricultural science, and many more, all of which agree on the nature and severity of the problems. Thirdly, there is virtual unanimity of thousands of scientists on the grave nature of these problems. Only a handful of skeptics remain. During the past decade many distinguished scientists, including numerous Nobel Laureates, have warned that humanity has perhaps one or two generations to act to avoid global ecological catastrophe. As but one example of this multidimensional problem, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has warned that global warming caused by fossil fuel consumption may be accelerating.7 Yet climate change is but one of a host of interrelated environmental problems that threaten humanity. The authors have seen the veils fall from the eyes of many scientists when they examine all the scientific literature. They become advocates for a fundamental change in society. The frequent proud statements on economic growth by treasurers and chancellors of the exchequer instill in many scientists an immediate sense of danger, for humanity has moved one step closer to doom. Science underpins the success of our technological and comfortable society. Who are the thousands of scientists who issue the warnings we choose to ignore? In 1992 the Royal Society of London and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences issued a joint statement, Population Growth, Resource Consumption and a Sustainable World,8 pointing out that the environmental changes affecting the planet may irreversibly damage the earth’s capacity to maintain life and that humanity’s own efforts to achieve satisfactory living conditions were threatened by environmental deterioration. Since 1992 many more statements by world scientific organizations have been issued.9 These substantiated that most environmental systems are suffering from critical stress and that the developed countries are the main culprits. It was necessary to make a transition to economies that provide increased human welfare and less consumption of energy and materials. It seems inconceivable that the consensus view of all these scientists could be wrong. There have been numerous international conferences of governments, industry groups, and environmental groups to discuss the problems and develop strategy, yet widespread deterioration of the environment accelerates. What is the evidence? The Guide to World Resources, 2000 –2001: People and Ecosystems, The Fraying Web of Life10 was a joint report of the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations Environment Program, the World Bank, and the World Resources Institute. The state of the world’s agricultural, coastal forest, freshwater, and grassland ecosystems were analyzed using 23 criteria such as food production, water quantity, and biodiversity. Eighteen of the criteria were decreasing, and one had increased (fiber production, because of the destruction of forests). The report card on the remaining four criteria was mixed or there was insufficient data to make a judgment. In 2005, The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Synthesis Report by 1,360 scientific experts from 95 countries was released.11 It stated that approximately 60 percent of the ecosystem services that support life on earth—such as fresh water, fisheries, and the regulation of air, water, and climate—are being degraded or used unsustainably. As a result the Millennium Goals agreed to by the UN in 2000 for addressing poverty and hunger will not be met and human well-being will be seriously affected.

#### Mutually exclusive ---- The Aff’s starting point for their method is incompatible with our alt ----- both are different responses to different situations

Connelly et al ’12 – Professor of Politics at Wake Forest University; Former Professor of Politics at the University of Hull (Connelly, James. Graham Smith. David Benson. Clare Saunders. “Politics and the Environment”. March 12, 2012. Pg 59-60)

Any survey of green political texts over the last few decades will reveal that there is a wide variety of political institutions and strategies for change endorsed as the way forward to a sustainable future. From democratic to authoritarian regimes, centralised states to decentralised communities, planned to free market economies, party politics to grassroots activism – all have found support at some time or another. 7 Such endorsements have often been a **response to** ***particular*** contexts and **situations**: Robyn Eckersley, for instance, highlights three interconnected ‘preoccupations’ within green political thought which can be seen as a response to particular circumstances (Eckersley 1992 : 8–20). The first preoccupation, the crisis of participation, evolved primarily during the 1960s in the civil rights movement. Its **central concern** is with participation in decision-making processes and issues of resource distribution, leading to a **recognition of** democracy and social justice as important themes within the green movement. The second preoccupation, the crisis of survival, was originally inspired by the publication of The Limits to Growth and A Blueprint for Survival and ‘marked the emergence of the global dimensions of environmental degradation and the common fate of humanity’ (Eckersley 1992 : 12). The apparent **urgency of the survivalist message** led many writers to call for authoritarian solutions to the environmental crisis thereby *contradicting* the democratic thrust of earlier commentators. The third and final preoccupation is the belief that environmental concerns are as much a crisis of culture and human character as a crisis of nature or the use of natural resources. If this is so, a broader ecological understanding of human needs, technology and self-image becomes essential with a recognition that it is in our interests, understood in a comprehensive manner, to become less dependent on technological responses to environmental and social problems. These preoccupations need to be recognised and each given due weight: but it is important to realise that they **may be in tension** with each other. For example, green concerns often stress the need for a holistic or organicistic approach to the solution of environmental problems, but these may in turn be markedly at odds with the concern for egalitarianism and the associated demands for social change which also form part of the agenda. If these tensions can be successfully addressed, green politics might then be linked with other emancipatory political projects that call for cultural renewal and the revitalisation of civil society. As Eckersley has argued: This new theoretical project is concerned to fi nd ways of overcoming the destructive logic of capital accumulation, the acquisitive values of consumer society, and, more generally, all systems of domination (including class domination, patriarchy, imperialism, totalitarianism, and the domination of nature).

#### Byrne and Toly 6 -

Byrne and Toly 6 (John Byrne, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate for his contribution to the IPCC, director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy and distinguished professor of energy and climate policy at the University of Delaware, Noah Toly, Director of Urban Studies and Associate Professor of Politics & International Relations, Wheaton College, 2006, *Transforming Power: Energy, Environment, and Society in Conflict*, eds. John Byrne, Noah Toly, Leigh Glover, pp. 19-29)

Democratic Authoritarian Impulses and Uncritical Capitalist Assumptions When measured in social and political-economic terms, the current energy discourse appears impoverished. Many of its leading voices proclaim great things will issue from the adoption of their strategies (conventional or sustainable), yet inquiry into the social and political-economic interests that power promises of greatness by either camp is mostly absent. In reply, some participants may petition for a progressive middle ground, acknowledging that energy regimes are only part of larger institutional formations that organize political and economic power. It is true that the political economy of energy is only a component of systemic power in the modern order, but it hardly follows that pragmatism toward energy policy and politics is the reasonable social response. Advocates of energy strategies associate their contributions with distinct pathways of social development and define the choice of energy strategy as central to the types of future(s) that can unfold. Therefore, acceptance of appeals for pragmatist assessments of energy proposals, that hardly envision incremental consequences, would indulge a form of selfdeception rather than represent a serious discursive position. An extensive social analysis of energy regimes of the type that Mumford (1934; 1966; 1970), Nye (1999), and others have envisioned is overdue. The preceding examinations of the two strategies potentiate conclusions about both the governance ideology and the political economy of modernist energy transitions that, by design, leave modernism undisturbed (except, per-haps, for its environmental performance). The Technique of Modern Energy Governance While moderns usually declare strong preferences for democratic governance, their preoccupation with technique and efficiency may preclude the achievement of such ambitions, or require changes in the meaning of democracy that are so extensive as to raise doubts about its coherence. A veneration of technical monuments typifies both conventional and sustainable energy strategies and reflects a shared belief in technological advance as commensurate with, and even a cause of, contemporary social progress. The modern proclivity to search for human destiny in the march of scientific discovery has led some to warn of a technological politics (Ellul, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; Winner, 1977, 1986) in which social values are sublimated by the objective norms of technical success (e.g., the celebration of efficiency in all things). In this politics, technology and its use become the end of society and members have the responsibility, as rational beings, to learn from the technical milieu what should be valorized. An encroaching autonomy of technique (Ellul, 1964: 133 - 146) replaces critical thinking about modern life with an awed sense and acceptance of its inevitable reality. From dreams of endless energy provided by Green Fossil Fuels and Giant Power, to the utopian promises of Big Wind and Small-Is-Beautiful Solar, technical excellence powers modernist energy transitions. Refinement of technical accomplishments and/or technological revolutions are conceived to drive social transformation, despite the unending inequality that has accompanied two centuries of modern energy’s social project. As one observer has noted (Roszak, 1972: 479), the “great paradox of the technological mystique [is] its remarkable ability to grow strong by chronic failure. While the treachery of our technology may provide many occasions for disenchantment, the sum total of failures has the effect of increasing dependence on technical expertise.” Even the vanguard of a sustainable energy transition seems swayed by the magnetism of technical acumen, leading to the result that enthusiast and critic alike embrace a strain of technological politics. Necessarily, the elevation of technique in both strategies to authoritative status vests political power in experts most familiar with energy technologies and systems. Such a governance structure derives from the democratic-authoritarian bargain described by Mumford (1964). Governance “by the people” consists of authorizing qualified experts to assist political leaders in finding the efficient, modern solution. In the narratives of both conventional and sustainable energy, citizens are empowered to consume the products of the energy regime while largely divesting themselves of authority to govern its operations. Indeed, systems of the sort envisioned by advocates of conventional and sustainable strategies are not governable in a democratic manner. Mumford suggests (1964: 1) that the classical idea of democracy includes “a group of related ideas and practices... [including] communal self-government... un-impeded access to the common store of knowledge, protection against arbi-trary external controls, and a sense of moral responsibility for behavior that affects the whole community.” Modern conventional and sustainable energy strategies invest in external controls, authorize abstract, depersonalized interactions of suppliers and demanders, and celebrate economic growth and technical excellence without end. Their social consequences are relegated in both paradigms to the status of problems-to-be-solved, rather than being recognized as the emblems of modernist politics. As a result, modernist democratic practice becomes imbued with an authoritarian quality, which “deliberately eliminates the whole human personality, ignores the historic process, [and] overplays the role of abstract intelligence, and makes control over physical nature, ultimately control over [hu]man[ity] himself, the chief purpose of existence” (Mumford, 1964: 5). Meaningful democratic governance is willingly sacrificed for an energy transition that is regarded as scientifically and technologically unassailable. Triumphant Energy Capitalism Where the power to govern is not vested in experts, it is given over to market forces in both the conventional and sustainable energy programs. Just as the transitions envisioned in the two paradigms are alike in their technical preoccupations and governance ideologies, they are also alike in their political-economic commitments. Specifically, modernist energy transitions operate in, and evolve from, a capitalist political economy. Huber and Mills (2005) are convinced that conventional techno-fixes will expand productivity and increase prosperity to levels that will erase the current distortions of inequality. Expectably, conventional energy’s aspirations present little threat to the current energy political economy; indeed, the aim is to reinforce and deepen the current infrastructure in order to minimize costs and sustain economic growth. The existing alliance of government and business interests is judged to have produced social success and, with a few environmental correctives that amount to the modernization of ecosystem performance, the conventional energy project fervently anticipates an intact energy capitalism that willingly invests in its own perpetuation. While advocates of sustainable energy openly doubt the viability of the conventional program and emphasize its social and environmental failings, there is little indication that capitalist organization of the energy system is faulted or would be significantly changed with the ascendance of a renewables- based regime. The modern cornucopia will be powered by the profits of a redirected market economy that diffuses technologies whose energy sources are available to all and are found everywhere. The sustainable energy project, according to its architects, aims to harness nature’s ‘services’ with technologies and distributed generation designs that can sustain the same impulses of growth and consumption that underpin the social project of conventional energy. Neither its corporate character, nor the class interests that propel capitalism’s advance, are seriously questioned. The only glaring difference with the conventional energy regime is the effort to modernize social relations with nature. In sum, conventional and sustainable energy strategies are mostly quiet about matters of concentration of wealth and privilege that are the legacy of energy capitalism, although both are vocal about support for changes consistent with middle class values and lifestyles. We are left to wonder why such steadfast reluctance exists to engaging problems of political economy. Does it stem from a lack of understanding? Is it reflective of a measure of satisfaction with the existing order? Or is there a fear that critical inquiry might jeopardize strategic victories or diminish the central role of ‘energy’ in the movement’s quest? Transition without Change: A Failing Discourse After more than thirty years of contested discourse, the major ‘energy futures’ under consideration appear committed to the prevailing systems of governance and political economy that animate late modernity. The new technologies—conventional or sustainable—that will govern the energy sector and accumulate capital might be described as centaurian technics in which the crude efficiency of the fossil energy era is bestowed a new sheen by high technologies and modernized ecosystems: capitalism without smoky cities, contaminated industrial landscapes, or an excessively carbonized atmosphere. Emerging energy solutions are poised to realize a postmodern transition (Roosevelt, 2002), but their shared commitment to capitalist political economy and the democratic-authoritarian bargain lend credence to Jameson’s assessment (1991) of postmodernism as the “cultural logic of late capitalism.” Differences in ecological commitments between conventional and sustainable energy strategies still demarcate a battleground that, we agree, is important—even fundamental. But so also are the common aspirations of the two camps. Each sublimates social considerations in favor of a politics of more-is-better, and each regards the advance of energy capitalism with a sense of inevitability and triumph. Conventional and sustainable energy visions equally presume that a social order governed by a ‘democratic’ ideal of cornucopia, marked by economic plenty, and delivered by technological marvels will eventually lance the wounds of poverty and inequality and start the healing process. Consequently, silence on questions of governance and social justice is studiously observed by both proposals. Likewise, both agree to, or demur on, the question of capitalism’s sustainability.22 Nothing is said on these questions because, apparently, nothing needs to be. If the above assessment of the contemporary energy discourse is correct, then the enterprise is not at a crossroad; rather, it has reached a point of acquiescence to things as they are. Building an inquiry into energy as a social project will require the recovery of a critical voice that can interrogate, rather than concede, the discourse’s current moorings in technological politics and capitalist political economy. A fertile direction in this regard is to investigate an energy-society order in which energy systems evolve in response to social values and goals, and not simply according to the dictates of technique, prices, or capital. Initial interest in renewable energy by the sustainability camp no doubt emanated, at least in part, from the fact that its fuel price is non-existent and that capitalization of systems to collect renewable sources need not involve the extravagant, convoluted corporate forms that manage the conventional energy regime. But forgotten, or misunderstood, in the attraction of renewable energy have been the social origins of such emergent possibilities. Communities exist today who address energy needs outside the global marketplace: they are often rural in character and organize energy services that are immune to oil price spikes and do not require water heated to between 550° and 900° Fahrenheit (300° and 500° Celsius) (the typical temperatures in nuclear reactors). No energy bills are sent or paid and governance of the serving infrastructure is based on local (rather than distantly developed professional) knowledge. Needless to say, sustainability is embodied in the lifeworld of these communities, unlike the modern strategy that hopes to design sustainability into its technology and economics so as not to seriously change its otherwise unsustainable way of life. Predictably, modern society will underscore its wealth and technical acumen as evidence of its superiority over alternatives. But smugness cannot overcome the fact that energy-society relations are evident in which the bribe of democratic-authoritarianism and the unsustainability of energy capitalism are successfully declined. In 1928, Mahatma Gandhi (cited in Gandhi, 1965: 52) explained why the democratic-authoritarian bargain and Western capitalism should be rejected: God forbid that India should ever take to industrialization after the manner of the West. The economic imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom (England) is today keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million took to similar eco-nomic exploitation, it would strip the world bare like locusts. Unless the capitalists of India help to avert that tragedy by becoming trustees of the welfare of the masses and by devoting their talents not to amassing wealth for themselves but to the service of the masses in an altruistic spirit, they will end either by destroying the masses or being destroyed by them. As Gandhi’s remark reveals, social inequality resides not in access to electric light and other accoutrements of modernity, but in a world order that places efficiency and wealth above life-affirming ways of life. This is our social problem, our energy problem, our ecological problem, and, generally, our political-economic problem. The challenge of a social inquiry into energy-society relations awaits.

#### Pluralism becomes hyperpluralism –--- only a risk of offense

**OPHULS, 1997**

Former Foreign Service Officer, Formerly taught at Northwestern University, Requiem for Modern Politics,

More participation, for example, is often put forward as the panacea for our political ills. But this is a singularly inappropriate remedy--unless those who participate do so in a responsible and public-spirited fashion, which is less and less the case. On the contrary, the conditions for genuine democratic participation are no longer present: not only is America a mass society populated by people without either a vision of the common interest or a desire to seek it, but the institutional channels even for mass democracy have largely dried up. For a whole complex of reasons, political parties, which used to buffer government from narrow or excessive demands, have fallen into desuetude. Partly as a result, old-style, broad-based interest groups, such as the National Association of Manufacturers or Americans for Democratic Action, which also served to aggregate and moderate political demands, are no longer important factors either. In addition, the character of de Tocqueville's "voluntary associations" has changed significantly: the Boy Scouts, the Red Cross, the Kiwanis, the PTA, and other broad-based, civic-minded groups are down; but Alcoholics Anonymous, Act Up, the American Association of Retired Persons, the Rainforest Alliance, and other the negative or even pathological side of "voluntary association" now predominates: when people do not simply withdraw into their wellstocked private "cocoons," they "clamor" for their "social wants" by joining with others to pursue **particular interests instead of the public good**. Political participation today almost always means joining or supporting a "single-issue constituency," a group that passionately pursues one very specific aim with little or no regard for the interests of others or of the whole. The logic of **organized selfishness** has therefore arrived at its **logical terminus**: American politics is an increasingly naked struggle between groups who care about one thing and one thing only--getting what they want at almost any cost. So out of pluralism has emerged the contentious politics of hyperpluralism.

#### L to democratic mythos --- they cause a transition to worse totalitarianism

Ophuls ’11 - former member of the U.S. Foreign Service and has taught political science at Northwestern University (Ophuls, William. “Plato's Revenge: Politics in the Age of Ecology.” 19 August 2011. P. 97-101)

Paideia is therapeia writ large. Therapeia is the restoration of unity to the psyche, so that the archetypal needs of the “ 2,000,000-year-old man ” are reconciled with the demands of civilized life. Paideia is the recovery of the “ aesthetic unity ” destroyed by a “ mere purposive rationality. ” It is a cure for the major insanity of a way of thinking and living that ignores the “ fundamental unity ” and is therefore “ necessarily patho- genic and destructive of life. ” To put it another way, therapeia is about achieving instinc- tual and emotional sanity, and paideia is about achieving cognitive and intellectual sanity: what epistemology, what way of thinking, what worldview, what myth or metaphor will foster a sane, humane, and ecologically viable way of life over the centuries to come? This is not a utopian quest to straighten the crooked timber of humanity. The passions can only be tamed, not transmuted, and politics as an arena of conﬂict will be with us forever. But greater sanity, both individual and collective, is within our grasp, provided that we ground ourselves in Bateson ’ s aesthetic unity. With this as our premise, we can discover and then insti- tute politically an Aristotelian rule of life that inclines our civi- lization toward a wise virtue instead of an unholy savagery. Unless we soon transform our purely instrumental relationship to life, we confront a bleak future of neurotic misery, social decline, spiritual poverty, and ecological destitution. Let us distinguish paideia from education as we commonly understand it. Most of what we call education is in fact school- ing in the methods and values of “ mere purposive rationality. ” With rare exceptions, students attend universities not to become better or more universal human beings but to obtain a credential that will lead to gainful employment in the mili- tary-industrial-ﬁ nancial-political-media complex — or in the university itself, which has (sad to say) become a kind of knowledge factory allied to the complex. So most students receive a narrow, technical education that prepares them for careers by rendering them marginally com- petent in mathematics or metaphor but rarely in both. Con- trary to the assertion of many that we have entered a new golden age of knowledge and learning, our educational factories therefore “ produce ” graduates who are, by the standards of the past, profoundly ignorant. Even the so-called best and brightest of today are mere specialists who, as it is said, know more and more about less and less. Paradoxically, for all the resources devoted to the education industry, its “ output ” is a kind of idiocy. Premodern thinkers like Montaigne and early modern thinkers like Locke had small personal libraries of a few hundred volumes, but they possessed a mastery of the Western tradition since earliest times and an integrated understanding of the workings of their respective societies. Whatever their personal or intellectual shortcomings, they therefore com- manded an overview of the human condition that was close to the best that their respective ages could achieve. We are intellectual paupers by comparison. An analog of Gresham ’ s law in the economy of mind has devalued knowl- edge, ﬁ rst by swamping it in information and then by submerg- ing it in data. We have an exact count of all the cats in Zanzibar, but meaning, context, and coherence utterly escape us. By contrast, paideia is “ the process of educating man into his true form, the real and genuine human nature. ” 2 It is edu- cation for excellence, education for statesmanship, education devoted to the Greek ideals of the beautiful and the good, education designed to inculcate a deep appreciation of the aesthetic unity of the world. The aristocratic connotations are obvious. Paideia is **intended to form an elite** in its original, nonpejorative sense — “the best or most skilled members of a given social group. ” By seeking to develop a natural aristocracy instead of an artiﬁcial meritocracy, paideia directly contradicts the prevailing *vulgar* democratic ethos, according to which there can be no “ betters. ” But **elites are inevitable**. **In *any*** ﬁeld of **human endeavor**, **the cream rises** **to the top** unless it is forcibly prevented from doing so. For instance, there are elite athletes and elite scholars. The realm of politics is more complicated yet not essentially different. Once the polity has grown too large to gather under an oak tree on the village commons, the burden and opportunity of governance necessarily fall on a relatively small group of insiders — that is, an oligarchy. The question is, is this oligarchy a genuine elite that governs according to an inspiring ideal and with some sense of noblesse oblige? Or is it a pseudo-elite — “ a narrow and powerful clique ” — that rules in its own interest and runs the state as a racket? Our current ruling class — a meritocratic oligarchy allied to a predatory plutocracy — seems to resemble the latter more closely than the former. Be that as it may, by the very nature of things, society and polity will always be directed by an oligarchy — but we must control the nature of the resulting ruling class to avoid winding up as oppressed subjects of a gangster elite. 3 Elites are also necessary, for the reason given by Gustave Le Bon: Civilisations as yet have only been created and directed by a small intellectual aristocracy, never by crowds. Crowds are only powerful for destruction. Their rule is always tantamount to a barbarian phase. A civilisation involves ﬁ xed rules, discipline, a passing from the instinctive to the rational state, forethought for the future, an elevated degree of culture — all of them conditions that crowds, left to themselves, have invariably shown themselves incapable of realizing. 4 What is worse, as Jung points out, **the absence of a good elite opens the door to a bad one**: The levelling down of the masses through suppression of the aristo- cratic or hierarchical structure natural to a community is bound, sooner or later, to lead to disaster. For, when everything outstanding is levelled down, the signposts are lost, and the longing to be led becomes an urgent necessity. 5 In short, without a genuine elite — one capable of upholding a rule of life that fosters some reasonable degree of wisdom and virtue and that responds realistically and effectively to chal- lenges — **no** society or **civilization** **can** long **endure**. Paideia is about discovering such an ethos and forming such an elite. I propose the epistemology, ontology, and ethic articulated in the previous three chapters as the new ethos. This radical transformation of our way of thinking and being would ground civilization on ecological, physical, and psychological reality rather than hubris. It would also inspire us to make a civilization more worthy of the name.

#### Focus on human suffering worsens environmental crises ---

**Elliott, 97** – Professor Emeritus of Philosophy @ University of Florida

(Herschel, “A General Statement of the Tragedy of the Commons,”<http://dieoff.org/page121.htm>)

Now, for the first time in the world's history, a single species -- man -- has developed the technological and economic means to exploit the resources of all the Earth's ecosystems at once. Human beings can watch the **gradual destruction** by simplification of the Earth's biosystem. Some tell-tale signs of this global process appear as deforestation, desertification, pollution, climate change, and the rapid extinction of species. Others appear as shortages of land, water, and biological resources. All over the world, scarcity is driving people away from the countryside and out of the regions and nations that can no longer support them. Some make up the flood of political or economic refugees. Others migrate to cities where they cause urban sprawl and an intractable scarcity of jobs, sanitation, housing, and the necessary infrastructure. Even now in the megacities of the world, **various forms of natural control** are working to reduce the size of the human population and its excessive environmental demands. They include **parental neglect, disease, unemployment, hopelessness, drug abuse**, gratuitous violence, **starvation**, ethnic conflict, terrorism, and warfare. This kind of empirical evidence supports the generalization that human beings are now stressing the world's ecosystems. Bolstered by the a priori, human-centered ethical doctrines of the monotheistic religions, everything that directs human behavior -- cultural and legal traditions, genetic determinants, the free-market economic system, and the material demands of industrial production -- all reinforce each other in producing a **steady growth in population** and consumption. Indeed as people all around the world go about the business of daily life, they demand more land, fuel, water, timber, and food. It is possible, however, that significant changes can be made in the complex of causes presently directing human activity which can put an end to the steady growth in population and to the constant increase in the production and consumption of goods and services. Nevertheless, if appropriate causal forces cannot be found to maintain human environmental demands in a sustainable equilibrium, then the step-by-step destruction of the Earth's ecosystems will remain the persisting -- and eventually tragic -- characteristic of human activity. Ecosystems have their own dynamic structure. Feedback mechanisms have evolved to maintain their stability. For example, one species may become dominant and take over much of the land and most of the biological resources in some ecosystem. And continued growth may have no destabilizing effects for quite some time. But as more and more of the system's biological wealth is concentrated in the bodies and artifacts of an exuberant species, other species evolve the means to utilize the abundant food source. Then as the newly adapted predators increase in number, they reduce the population of the prolific species. If, however, such controls should fail, the continued growth of any organism at some point will begin to stress the ecosystem which sustains that organism. Finally the additional stress of continued growth will make the system collapse, **suddenly and** apparently **without warning.** **Nature does control any** exuberant **species either by drastically reducing its population or by its extinction.** This sequence of biological events is of decisive importance for ethics. It proves that the two opposing theories of ethics which presently vie for acceptance both lead to tragedy. Both an ethics grounded in a self-centered individualism and an ethics which builds on the need for a self-sacrificing altruism have the same inherent defects. Both have inbuilt, positive feedback mechanisms which cause a steady increase in the human exploitation of the Earth's biological resources. All such material demands, however, are constrained by the limited resource use which the biosystem can sustain. Exceeding this carrying capacity will cause that system to collapse into a simpler state which is **incapable of supporting civilization** in its present form and perhaps most of the complex forms of mammalian life as well. This is the tragedy that awaits mankind, if people do not begin to live as responsible members of the Earth's system of mutually sustaining life forms.

#### Unrestricted access to resources promotes unrestrained growth. This causes us to overshoot our carrying capacity. Eliminating freedoms is key to check this.

Garrett **Hardin**. University of Chicago B.S. Zoology + Stanford University - Ph.D. Microbiology, 19**68**. The Tragedy of the Commons, <http://www> garretthardinsociety.org,'articlcs/art\_tragedy\_of\_the\_comtnons.html,

The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will trv to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries bccause tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is. the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize ~~his~~ gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to mv herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component. 1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular dcc is ion-making herdsman is only a fraction of-1. Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the onlv sensible course for ~~him~~ to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another.... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Bach ~~man~~ is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing hie own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. WE DON’T ENDORSE GENDER INEQUALITY

#### Short time preference hijacks democracy to come – makes environmental crisis inevitable

Fritsch 2011 (Matthias, “Taking Turns: Democracy to Come and Intergenerational Justice,” Derrida Today 4.2 (2011): 154-55)

Why should we be interested in the intergenerational dimension of democracy to come? In wondering whether today this vintage Derridean concept still contributes to our political discussions and concerns, we may note that democracy to come appears not to have been explored in relation to intergenerational justice, despite the fact that the latter is one of the most important and, despite the historically long view it requires, most urgent political themes today. The urgent salience of extending our moral and political horizon further into the future than has so far been the case is mandated by the fact that the rise of technology has extended the consequences of our actions and science our knowledge of these consequences. For good reasons, climate change is the most visible intergenerational concern in this area, but there are also the worries over the steep rise in the loss of biodiversity and similar environmental issues, while the passing on of massive national (and often private) debt to subsequent generations threatens to compromise their means to address the vital environmental concerns. All of these complications are to be handled by the political form of government of which we said that, in various and uneven forms that often provide a mere ideological cover, is being globalized at the domestic and the international level. And it is this form that has been accused, with good reason, of a presentist bias: Dennis Thompson (coauthor, with Amy Gutmann, of the much acclaimed Democracy and Disagreement), argues that ‘Democracies are systematically biased in favor of the present’ (Thompson 2005, 246). The priority given to the present has been analyzed, politically and economically, in terms of the short-term thinking said to be brought on by democracy’s relation to free market competition (in particular in post-Fordist capitalism; see Harvey 1990); by the frequent change of guards required by the electoral cycles of representative democracy (cf. Gardiner 2006; Garvey 2008; Dryzek 1996; Wood 2008), or by the mere fact of pure time preference on the part of the populace, perhaps justifying the implementation of a positive social discount rate on the part of its representatives (Thompson 2005; 2010). Indeed, democracy’s rather poor record on sustainable practices and combating climate change has prompted some to speak of a ‘failure of democracy’ that would demand that we urgently replace sovereign democratic freedoms, in particular those regarding individual and collective self-determination, with ‘survival’ as ‘the most fundamental value’ (Shearman & Smith 2007, 133; cf. Giddens 2009, 73; Tremmel 2006).

#### liberating agency always puts the environment at the backburner

**Tittle 98** “The Humanist View of Animal Rights”

First, if humanism 'just' emphasized human-as-opposed-to-god, that is, if it were merely a reaction to belief in the supernatural, it would put at its centre, the natural. But it goes one further, it goes one narrower, it puts at its centre the human. It's called humanism, not naturalism.¶ In fact, humanism seems to pride itself on not being merely 'a reaction to.' On more than one occasion, and in "Are You a Humanist?" in particular, it compares itself to atheism: atheism is merely reactionary, negative, anti-religion; humanism, on the other hand, is proactive, positive, pro-human. So whereas naturalism is more general and would include non-human animals, humanism seems specifically, almost intentionally, to exclude them.¶ Second, humanism, "as defined in most dictionaries, [is] a way of life centred on human interests and values..." ("The Humanist Alternative" p.1, emphasis added). Now this is not to say that non-humans can't also be in the centre. But the word 'human' appears in so many principles, the specific-ness seems hardly accidental: "Humanism aims at the full development of every human being" (#1, emphasis added); "Humanists uphold the broadest application of **democratic principles** in all human relationships" (#2, emphasis added); "Humanists affirm the dignity of every person and the right of the individual to maximum possible freedom compatible with the rights of others" (#4 emphasis, added); "Humanists acknowledge human interdependence, the need for mutual respect, and the kinship of all humanity..." (#5, emphasis added); "Humanists call for continuous improvement of **the quality of life** so that no living human being may be deprived of the basic necessities of life" (#6, emphasis added); "Humanists support the development and extension of fundamental human rights..." (#7 emphasis added).¶ Given such a relentless focus on human development, relationships, and quality of life, one hardly needs to ask, regarding the third principle, "Humanists advocate the use of the scientific method, both as a guide to distinguish fact from fiction, and as a tool to develop beneficial and creative uses of science and technology"--beneficial for who?¶ And though a hierarchy with humans at the top is not described, I believe this view of human at the centre puts animals as much in a subordinate area. Indeed, "...humanists regard ethical inquiry as evolving like any other human endeavour, changing over time to meet the changing needs of the human species" ("The Humanist Alternative" p.2, emphasis added) [5].¶ My third reason for thinking that the humanist view leans away from animal rights is that any extrapolations I can make from the principles that might support animal rights are rather weak. The fourth principle insists that the rights of the individual to freedom must be compatible with "the rights of others" and the ninth principle speaks of "a sense of responsibility to oneself and to others." Could those others include animals? It didn't say "the rights of other humans" or "the responsibility to...other humans." But I think I'm grasping at straws here.¶ The eleventh principle states that "Humanists affirm that human and world problems can be resolved only by means of human reason, compassion, and intelligent effort." World problems might involve animals, yes? And the compassion we are directed to use might at least justify their right not to be tortured, yes? Maybe.¶ Given these weak arguments and the overwhelmingly strong focus on human interests, it seems to me that the **only** **animal rights arguments humanists would accept are *instrumental ones***. Instrumental arguments, such as those put forth by Baxter [6], Passmore [7], and Guthrie [8], claim that animals have rights only insofar as they are of value to us. Animals are viewed, thus, as means to our ends, as instruments for ***our*** development, *our* interests, *our* quality of life.¶ Contrary, perhaps, to initial assumptions, instrumental arguments do not necessarily lead to rather limited animal rights. Animals may have scientific and medical value (they may be good for research), commercial value (parts of them can be sold, they can be used for income-generating activities), game value (they're used for food), observational value (we like to look at them, in zoos and sanctuaries), recreational value (they're fun to play with), and/or ecological value (the species may be important to the ecosystem) [9].¶ So insofar as their rights are derived from their value [10], they may have many rights (or at least the most important ones). Humanists can argue that cows have the right to graze (rather than be fed a chemical diet) because it's in our best interests to eat such cows (and not the ones pumped full of steroids and what have you). And I can argue that because my happiness depends on chessie's happiness [11], she has a right to be happy (and therefore will get a new stuffed toy for her birthday). In fact, the more we understand that we live in a complex web of life, that we depend on the ecosystem's stability for our survival, the more favourably we'll consider the other lifeforms in that ecosystem [12]. So humanists may argue that plankton have rights too.¶ Even though instrumental arguments might justify a sufficiently broad range of animal rights, I'm uncomfortable with stopping here. There's something a little distasteful about using others--any others--as a means to one's own ends. And there's something very egocentric, very speciesist [13] in the anthropocentricity of this view. Isn't it selfish exploitation, pure and simple? If it gives pleasure and thus improves the quality of our lives to injure and sometimes kill animals just for the hell of it, well, that would be justified on instrumental grounds. It seems then that humanism must condone sport hunting.

#### Only top-down, centralized imposition of constraints on freedom can guarantee planetary survival---their ethic will inevitably fail to improve ecological outcomes---an accelerating crisis makes authoritarianism inevitable, and the worse the environment gets, the worse the constraints on freedom will be

Mathew Humphrey 7, Reader in Political Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, UK, 2007, Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory: The Challenge to the Deliberative Ideal, p. 14-15

In terms of the first of these points, that our democratic choices reflect a narrow understanding of our immediate interests and not an enlightened view of our long-term welfare, the case is made by Ophuls. He claims that we are now 'so committed to most of the things that cause or support the evils' with which he is concerned that 'we are almost paralysed; nearly all the constructive actions that could be taken at present... are so painful to so many people in so many ways that they are indeed totally unrealistic, and neither politicians nor citizens would tolerate them' (Ophuls, 1977: 224).4 Environmentally friendly policies can be justifiably imposed upon a population that 'would do something quite different if it was merely left to its own immediate desires and devices' (Ophuls, 1977: 227): currently left to these devices, the American people 'have so far evinced little willingness to make even minor sacrifices... for the sake of environmental goals' (Ophuls, 1977: 197). Laura Westra makes a similar argument in relation to the collapse of Canadian cod fisheries, which is taken to illustrate a wider point that we cannot hope to 'manage' nature when powerful economic and political interests are supported by 'uneducated democratic preferences and values' (Westra, 1998: 95). More generally reducing our 'ecological footprint' means 'individual and aggregate restraints the like of which have not been seen in most of the northwestern world. For this reason, it is doubtful that persons will freely embrace the choices that would severely curtail their usual freedoms and rights... even in the interests of long-term health and self-preservation.” (Westra, 1998: 198). Thus we will require a 'top-down' regulatory regime to take on 'the role of the "wise man" of Aristotelian doctrine as well as 'bottom-up' shifts in values (Westra, 1998: 199). Ophuls also believes that in certain circumstances (of which ecological crisis is an example) 'democracy must give way to elite rule' (1977: 159) as critical decisions have to be made by competent people. The classic statement of the collective action problem in relation to environmental phenomena was that of Hardin (1968). The 'tragedy' here refers to the "remorseless working of things' towards an 'inevitable destiny' (Hardin, 1968: 1244, quoting A. N. Whitehead). Thus even if we are aware of where our long-term, enlightened interests do lie, the preferred outcome is beyond our ability to reach in an uncoerced manner. This is the n-person prisoners' dilemma, a well established analytical tool in the social analysis of collectively suboptimal outcomes. A brief example could be given in terms of an unregulated fishery. The owner of trawler can be fully aware that there is collective over-extraction from the fishing grounds he uses, and so the question arises of whether he should self-regulate his own catch. If he fishes to his maximum capacity, his gain is a catch fractionally depleted from what it would be if the fisheries were fully stocked. If the 'full catch' is 1, then this catch is 1 - £, where £ is the difference between the full stock catch and the depleted stock catch divided by the number of fishing vessels. If the trawlerman regulates his own catch, then he loses the entire amount that he feels each boat needs to surrender, and furthermore he has no reason to suppose that other fishermen would behave in a similar fashion, in fact he will expect them to benefit by catching the fish that he abjures. In the language of game theory he would be a 'sucker', and the rational course of action is to continue taking the maximum catch, despite the predictable conclusion that this course of action, when taken by all fishermen making the same rational calculation, will lead to the collapse of the fishery. Individual rationality leads to severely suboptimal outcomes. Under these circumstances an appeal to conscience is useless, as it merely places the recipient of the appeal in a 'double-bind'. The open appeal is 'behave as a responsible citizen, or you will be condemned. But there is also a covert appeal in the opposite direction; 'If you do behave as we ask, we will secretly condemn you for a simpleton who can be shamed into standing aside while the rest of us exploit the commons' (Hardin, 1968: 246). Thus the appeal creates the imperative both to behave responsibly and to avoid being a sucker. In terms of democracy, what this entails is that, in general, we have to be prepared to accept coercion in order to overcome the collective action problem.5 The Leviathan of the state is the institution that has the political power required to solve this conundrum. 'Mutual coercion, mutually agreed on" is Hardin's famous solution to the tragedy of the commons. Revisiting the 'tragedy' argument in 1998, Hardin held that '[i]ts message is, I think, still true today. Individualism is cherished because it produces freedom, but the gift is conditional: The more population exceeds the carrying capacity of the environment, the more freedoms must be given up' (Hardin, 1998: 682). On this view coercion is an integral part of politics: the state coerces when it taxes, or when it prevents us from robbing banks. Coercion has, however, become 'a dirty word for most liberals now' (Hardin, 1968: 1246) but this does not have to be the case as long as this coercion comes about as a result of the democratic will. This however, requires overcoming the problems raised by the likes of Ophuls and Westra, that is, it is dependent upon the assumption that people can agree to coerce each other in order to realise their long-term, 'enlightened' self-interest. If they cannot, and both the myopic and collective action problem ecological objections to democracy arc valid, then this coercion may not be 'mutually agreed upon' but rather imposed by Ophuls' ecological 'elite' or Westra's Aristotelian 'wise man'. Under these circumstances there seems to be no hope at all for a reconciliation of ecological imperatives and democratic decision-making: we are faced with a stark choice, democracy or ecological survival.

#### Their participation in deliberative forums is disempowering and exacerbates power differentials within communities---turns the whole case and means decisions are worse than they’d be with no deliberation at all

Tina Nabatchi 7, Assistant Professor of Public Administration and International Affairs and a Faculty Research Associate at the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration at Syracuse University, 2007, Deliberative Democracy: The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy, p. 66-67

As noted earlier, one of the strongest arguments in favor of deliberative democracy is that such participation has intrinsic benefits for citizens. Not all agree with this assertion. Some scholars argue that the inverse is true, that participation can injure citizens, causing them to feel frustrated and to perceive personal inefficacy and powerlessness. Real-life deliberation can fan emotions unproductively, can exacerbate rather than diminish power differentials among those deliberating, can make people feel frustrated with the system that made them deliberate, is ill-suited to many issues, and can lead to worse decisions than would have occurred if no deliberation had taken place (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 191). Advocates of deliberative democracy argue that "[w]hen people come into contact with those who are different, they become better citizens, as indicated in their values and behavior" (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005: 232); however, to get the full benefits of associational involvement, the groups must be diverse. The logic here is straightforward - to experience the benefits of deliberation, one must hear a variety of viewpoints. Despite this argument, social psychology research indicates that it is difficult to get people involved in heterogeneous groups, and that when they do join such a group, they tend to interact with groups members who are similar to them (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005; Sunstein, 2003).

#### The plan is a worse abuse of centralization---the overwhelming majority of people want to have less involvement in politics, not more---the aff paradoxically forces people into a deconstructive system they don’t want

Tina Nabatchi 7, Assistant Professor of Public Administration and International Affairs and a Faculty Research Associate at the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration at Syracuse University, 2007, Deliberative Democracy: The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy, p. 64-65

Not all scholars agree that deliberative democracy has such benefits; in fact, many see a distinct dark side to deliberative democracy. On a practical note, some scholars point to the high the transaction costs for participants in deliberative forums and suggest that these costs may outweigh the potential benefits of participation for citizens and policy makers (e.g., Huntington, 1975). For citizens, transaction costs may include time, money (e.g., lost wages or child care costs), and otherwise forgoing more preferable activities (Rydin and Pennington, 2000). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) articulate this issue well: The last thing people want is to be more involved political decisionmaking; they do not want to provide much input to those who are assigned to make these decisions; and they would rather not know all the details of the decisionmaking process. Most people have strong feelings on few if any of the issues the government needs to address and would much prefer to spend their time in non-political pursuits. Moreover, "securing broad-based, meaningful deliberation on contentious issues from ordinary citizens, most of whom have little desire to engage in public policy discussions, is next to impossible no matter how creative the contrived forum may be" (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005: 228). Following this argument, the lack of political participation among Americans may in fact not be a bellwether of democratic crisis, but rather a sign of widespread content and satisfaction with the status quo (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002; Macedo et ah, 2005). In fact some scholars argue that many of the problems of governance in the United States today stem from an excess of democracy (Huntington, 1975: 113).

#### Elite control is inevitable---only a stable transition to eco-authoritarianism causes elite governance based on environmental principles of sustainability for everyone---solves all their elitism impacts

David Shearman 7, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC; and Joseph Wayne Smith, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism, 2007, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, p. 131-134

It is foolish to attempt to sketch any detailed model of what an ecologically sustainable authoritarian government would be like. We cannot anticipate the full scope of the environmental damage to which the planet will be subjected before humans wake up, if they do so at all. However some broad generalizations can be made at this point in history. We propose that any sustainable society, even if it takes the form of a group of tribes living in a state depicted by the Mad Max/Road Warrior movies will be centered around ecology rather than economics. Concerns will be biologically based rather than consumption based. This will become the necessity. Recognizing the move to conflict and war for environmental resources (chapter 3) we emphasize the need for structures that utilize peaceful mechanisms. However attractive to us as near primates, the guerrilla methods of The Monkey Wrench Gang29 must be denounced. We advocate a form of governance by authoritarianism abhorrent to liberal thinkers. But society is already managed by the hidden hand of the financial elite, and freedom is illusory and diminishing. Little can be done about the fact that we, the ordinary people, will wear chains, as we have always done. But perhaps the type of chains and how tightly they bind us can be influenced by our thinking. We commence with a description of the elites that we don’t want; it is then possible to see the flip side of this character. Government today is primarily influenced by economic policies and modes of thought and is executed by the elected politician who with very few exceptions has emerged as adept at working corrupt party machines. Those who out- maneuver their colleagues to gain leadership are reluctant to leave and often begin the inevitable moves to authoritarianism. They are universally poorly regarded by the electors, and it is worthwhile to quote the insightful remarks of that brilliant iconoclastic writer and political commentator H.L. Mencken (1880–1956) who observed that politicians seldom if ever get there [into power] by merit alone, at least in democratic states. Sometimes, to be sure, it happens, but only by a kind of miracle. They are chosen normally for quite different reasons, the chief of which is simply their power to impress and enchant the intellectually underprivileged . . . Will any of them venture to tell the plain truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about the situation of the country, foreign or domestic? Will any of them refrain from promises that he knows he can’t fulfill—that no human being could fulfill? Will any of them utter a word, however obvious, that will alarm and alienate any of the huge pack of morons who cluster at the public trough, wallowing in the pap that grows thinner and thinner, hoping against hope? Answer: maybe for a few weeks at the start . . . But not after the issue is fairly joined, and the struggle is on in earnest . . . they will divest themselves from their character as sensible, candid and truthful men, and become simply candidates for office, bent only on collaring votes.30 Hans-Hermann Hoppe in his book Democracy: The God that Failed develops Mencken’s critique of democracy in this respect.31 He says that democratic popular elections make it impossible (difficult, we believe) for good and decent people to rise to the top. Much like a pot of boiling water containing impurities, the scum will rise to the top. And as we have seen, they do so. Hoppe, with his typical tough turn of phrase, laments that under democracy the leaders are increasingly bad and sadly only “rarely assassinated.”32 The democratic system itself attracts to politics those people who are the most unsuitable for government. We should add that most authoritarian systems are also defective in this respect. The ruling elites typically first obtain power by violence, usually in the midst of the breakdown of democracy. An oppressive state machine is then set up and perpetuated by megalomaniac types who lust for power as a mode of personal advancement. Have we set ourselves an insurmountable problem? Who are to be new elites? In capitalist society, where money and self-promotion rule, they are invisible. Since we wish to avoid self-selection, how are they to be drafted into service? Intellectualism alone is not sufficient, for in the past century the intellectual has succumbed to the hymns of tyranny as often as the rest of us.33 Perhaps we could commence by identifying those leaders in history who were humble and worked for the common good. Yes, there were some who did not fit the selfish mores of society. We crucified them, ignored them, burned them, or, in modern times, shot them. Jesus Christ, Buddha, Socrates, St. Francis of Assisi, Dali Lama, and Gandhi. The difficulty of the task indicates the inadequacies of humankind. Let us take the question a stage further. Are there any individuals, not interested in self-aggrandizement and accumulation of material assets, who have broad intellectual, scientific, and social managerial skills to lead humanity through the environmental crisis? By definition, they have not placed their head above the parapet to join the scramble of economic rationalism. Such persons of integrity and learning have been sought for centuries. Aristotle referred to them as aristocracy. This meant ”the best,” as interpreted by Graham in The Case Against the Democratic State.34 They were those with the abilities and attitudes of mind to be entrusted with government. The sixteenth century philosopher Etienne de la Boetie said in his treatise, The Politics of Obedience, the following: There are always a few, better endowed than others . . . These are in fact the men who, possessed of clear minds and farsighted spirit, are not satisfied, like the brutish mass, to see what is at their feet, but rather look about them, behind and before, and even recall the things of the past in order to judge those of the future, and compare both with their present condition. These are the ones who, having good minds of their own, have further trained them by study and learning. Even if liberty had finally perished from the earth, such men would invent it. For them slavery has no satisfaction, no matter how well disguised.35 Both de la Boetie and Hoppe are primarily concerned with the preservation of freedom of the individual, this being the core value in their systems. But for us freedom is not the most fundamental value and is merely one value among others. Survival strikes us as a much more basic value. Now our proposal is that since fighters for freedom are always likely to arise, the probability of fighters for life and survival arising must be as great if not greater. This will be especially so if the opportunity is provided for such ecowarrior/philosophers to develop and be nurtured in special institutions called “real universities” or academies. At present our leaders are primarily trained in institutions that perpetuate and legitimate our environmentally destructive system. The conventional university trains narrow, politically correct thinkers who ultimately become the economic warriors of the system. Our proposal is to counter this by an alternative framework for the training and complete education of a new type of person who will be wise and fit to serve and to rule. Unlike the narrowly focused economic rationalist universities of today, the real university will train holistic thinkers in all of the arts and sciences necessary for tough decision making that the environmental crisis confronts us with. These thinkers will be the true public intellectuals with knowledge well grounded in ecology. Chapter 9 will describe in more detail how we might begin the process of constructing such real universities to train the ecowarriors to do battle against the enemies of life. We must accomplish this education with the dedication that Sparta used to train its warriors. As in Sparta, these natural elites will be especially trained from childhood to meet the challenging problems of our times. Government in the future will be based upon (or incorporate, depending on the level of breakdown of civilization) a supreme office of the biosphere. The office will comprise specially trained philosopher/ecologists. These guardians will either rule themselves or advise an authoritarian government of policies based upon their ecological training and philosophical sensitivities. These guardians will be specially trained for this task.

#### Human rights don’t make sense in the context of scarcity – lifeboat ethics turns and outweighs their feel-good impacts

**Elliott and Lamm, 2** - \*Emeritus Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Florida and \*\*former Governor of Colorado, Professor at the University of Denver, Executive Director of the University of Denver’s Center for Public Policy and Contemporary Issues

(Herschel and Richard D, “A Moral Code for a Finite World,” The Chronicle Review, Volume 49, Issue 12, Page B0, The Chronicle of Higher Education, November 15, 2002, <http://chronicle.com/free/v49/i12/12b00701.htm>)

What if global warming is a reality, and expanding human activity is causing irreparable harm to the ecosystem? What if the demands of a growing human population and an expanding global economy are causing our oceans to warm up, our ice caps to melt, our supply of edible fish to decrease, our rain forests to disappear, our coral reefs to die, our soils to be eroded, our air and water to be polluted, and our weather to include a growing number of floods and droughts? What if it is sheer hubris to believe that our species can grow without limits? What if the finite nature of the earth's resources imposes limits on what human beings can morally do? What if our present moral code is ecologically unsustainable? A widely cited article from the journal Science gives us one answer. Garrett Hardin's "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968) demonstrated that when natural resources are held in common -- freely available to everyone for the taking -- the incentives that normally direct human activity lead people to steadily increase their exploitation of the resources until they are inadequate to meet human needs. The exploiters generally do not intend to cause any harm; they are merely taking care of their own needs, or those of others in want. Nevertheless, the entire system moves inexorably to disaster. Everyone in the world shares in the resulting tragedy of the commons. Today, our standard of living, our economic system, and the political stability of our planet all require the increasing use of energy and natural resources. In addition, much of our political, economic, and social thinking assumes a continuous expansion of economic activity, with little or no restraint on our use of resources. We all feel entitled to grow richer every year. **Social justice requires an expanding pie to share with those who are less fortunate.** Progress is growth; the economies of developed nations require steady increases in consumption. What if such a scenario is unsustainable? What if we need an ethics for a finite world, an ethics of the commons? It is not important that you agree with the premise. What is important is that you help debate the alternatives. An ethics of the commons would require a change in the criteria by which moral claims are justified. You may believe that current rates of population growth and economic expansion can go on forever -- but debate with us what alternative ethical theories would arise if they cannot. Our thesis is that any ethical system is mistaken and immoral if its practice would cause an environmental collapse. Many people assume that moral laws and principles are absolutely certain, that we can know the final moral truth. If moral knowledge is certain, then factual evidence is irrelevant, for it cannot limit or refute what is morally certain. Our ethics and concepts of human rights have been formulated for a world of a priori reasoning and unchanging conclusions. Kant spoke for that absolutist ethical tradition when he argued that only knowledge that is absolutely certain can justify the slavish obedience that moral law demands. He thought he had found rational grounds to justify the universal and unchanging character of moral law. Moral knowledge, he concluded, is a priori and certain. It tells us, for example, that murder, lying, and stealing are wrong. The fact that those acts may sometimes seem to benefit someone cannot diminish the absolute certainty that they are wrong. Thus, for example, it is a contradiction to state that murder can sometimes be right, for, by its very nature, murder is wrong. Many human rights are positive rights that involve the exploitation of resources. (Negative rights restrain governments and don't require resources. For example, governments shouldn't restrict our freedom of speech or tell us how to pray.) Wherever in the world a child is born, that child has all the inherent human rights -- including the right to have food, housing, and medical care, which others must provide. When positive rights are accorded equally to everyone, they first allow and then support constant growth, of both population and the exploitation of natural resources. That leads to a pragmatic refutation of the belief that moral knowledge is certain and infallible. If a growing population faces a scarcity of resources, then an ethics of universal human rights with equality and justice for all will fail. Those who survive will inevitably live by a different ethics. Once the resources necessary to satisfy all human needs become insufficient, our options will be bracketed by two extremes. One is to ration resources so that everyone may share the inadequate supplies equally and justly. The other is to have people act like players in a game of musical chairs. In conditions of scarcity, there will be more people than chairs, so some people will be left standing when the music stops. Some -- the self-sacrificing altruists -- will refuse to take the food that others need, and so will perish. Others, however, will not play by the rules. Rejecting the ethics of a universal and unconditional moral law, they will fight to get the resources they and their children need to live. **Under neither extreme, nor all the options in between, does it make sense to analyze the problem through the lens of human rights.** The flaw in an ethical system of universal human rights, unqualified moral obligations, and equal justice for all can be stated in its logically simplest form: If to try to live by those principles under conditions of scarcity causes it to be impossible to live at all, then **the practice of that ethics will cease.** Scarcity renders such formulations useless and ultimately causes such an ethics to become extinct. We have described not a world that we want to see, but one that we fear might come to be. Humans cannot have a moral duty to deliver the impossible, or to supply something if the act of supplying it harms the ecosystem to the point where life on earth becomes unsustainable. Moral codes, no matter how logical and well reasoned, and human rights, no matter how compassionate, must make sense within the limitations of the ecosystem; we cannot disregard the factual consequences of our ethics. If acting morally compromises the ecosystem, then moral behavior must be rethought. Ethics cannot demand a level of resource use that the ecosystem cannot tolerate. The consequences of human behavior change as the population grows. Most human activities have a point of moral reversal, before which they may cause great benefit and little harm, but after which they may cause so much harm as to overwhelm their benefits. Here are a few representative examples, the first of which is often cited when considering Garrett Hardin's work: In a nearly empty lifeboat, rescuing a drowning shipwreck victim causes benefit: It saves the life of the victim, and it adds another person to help manage the boat. But in a lifeboat loaded to the gunwales, rescuing another victim makes the boat sink and causes only harm: Everyone drowns. When the number of cars on a road is small, traveling by private car is a great convenience to all. But as the cars multiply, a point of reversal occurs: The road now contains so many cars that such travel is inconvenient. The number of private cars may increase to the point where everyone comes to a halt. Thus, in some conditions, car travel benefits all. In other conditions, car travel makes it impossible for anyone to move. It can also pump so much carbon dioxide into the atmosphere that it alters the world's climate. Economic growth can be beneficial when land, fuel, water, and other needed resources are abundant. But it becomes harmful when those resources become scarce, or when exploitation causes ecological collapse. Every finite environment has a turning point, at which further economic growth would produce so much trash and pollution that it would change from producing benefit to causing harm. After that point is reached, additional growth only increases scarcity and decreases overall productivity. In conditions of scarcity, economic growth has a negative impact. Every environment is finite. Technology can extend but not eliminate limits. An acre of land can support only a few mature sugar maples; only so many radishes can grow in a five-foot row of dirt. Similar constraints operate in human affairs. When the population in any environment is small and natural resources plentiful, every additional person increases the welfare of all. As more and more people are added, they need increasingly to exploit the finite resources of the environment. At a certain point, the members of an increasing population become so crowded that they stop benefiting each other; by damaging the environment that supports everyone, by limiting the space available to each person, and by increasing the amount of waste and pollution, their activity begins to cause harm. That is, population growth changes from good to bad. And if the population continues to expand, its material demands may so severely damage the environment as to cause a tragedy of the commons -- the collapse of both environment and society.

#### Their ethics link to the DA and cause extinction

**Rohe, 6** – J.D, Board of Directors of the Federation for American Immigration Reform

(John F, “Book Review of "Ethics for a Finite World" by Herschel Elliott,” The Social Contract Journal, Volume 16, Number 2, Winter 2005-2006, <http://www.thesocialcontract.com/artman2/publish/tsc1602/article_1381.shtml>)

Conventional ethics are enshrined in the United Nations' "universal human rights." The rights mandate is self-perpetuating as long as the biological web is accommodating. The mandate, however, **bears no relationship to an ecosystem's ability to offer support.** Rights are unrelated to the cause of hardship. In a world of abundance, the U.N. ethics offer a rational framework. Amid scarcity, however, **universal human rights become a recipe for** desperation and **extinction.** The ethic turns on itself. It devours its subjects. Elliot's ethical analysis exposes human vulnerability. As scarcities expand, universal human rights assure universal human collapse. Unqualified aid to overpopulated regions, for example, subsidizes overpopulation, the very cause of hardship. Unqualified aid and a growth ethic divorces responsibility for overpopulation from responsibility for remedial measures. In time, the ethic inflicts dispassionate cruelty. It conflicts with biological standards of decency. Nevertheless, it comports with the U.N.'s ethical mandate. Every species tests the carrying capacity of its niche in the ecosystem. To breach the carrying capacity is to enroll in a hazardous Darwinian experiment. Striking a responsible biological balance might not be humanity's preferred choice, but it is an ungovernable reality. Natural systems will be the final arbiter. Rules in this domain are unappealable. Elliott proffers an ethical system based less on human hopes and more on biological realities. Biological imperatives clash with Western notions of how things ought to be. Elliott reminds us of Vice President Cheney's mantra "Our lifestyle is not negotiable." Perhaps Cheney has never negotiated with vanishing fossil fuel reserves. Manmade laws are not necessarily reconcilable with the laws of nature. Yogi Berra concludes "Nature bats last." Our growth ethic has been assuaged by the fortuitous discovery of abundant resources. Blinded by the dizzying treasure trove of resources and fossil fuels, we have been lulled into a human-centered ethical system. The endowment, however, remains finite. As limits are approached, the momentum of unchecked growth (in human numbers or consumption) is destined to be arrested.

## 1NR

#### Their equation of Switch-side and Rightist conservativism hides neo-liberalism within ecopedagogies

Bowers 05 (Professor at Oregon, Journal of Transformative Education Vol. 3 No. 2, April 2005 116-125)

The labeling of the ideology and practices of economic globalization as conservative helps to hide the basic reality that is being experienced by nearly everybody on a daily basis: namely, that the growing dominance of a market mentality is forcing people around the world to engage in a version of transformative learning; but it’s not the emancipatory or progressive view of transformative learning promised by its proponents. Rather, new technologies are forcing transformations in how people think and respond to an increasing rate of change. An example of how progressive programs do not fit the vision of Freire, Dewey, and their followers include how global warming is changing the basic weather patterns of the Inuit of northern Canada, which forces to the Inuit to relearn how to read new and increasingly unpredictable patterns. The culture is similarly being degraded. In addition, of the still nearly 6,000 languages still spoken in the world today, a third of them are in danger of becoming extinct in the near future. Conserving this diversity in language/knowledge systems is directly related to conserving biological diversity as these languages encode knowledge accumulated over many generations of living in one place and from observing the interdependent relationships that make up the natural and cultural ecology. Unfortunately, transformative learning theorists have not become a voice for educational reforms that support linguistic and by extension, biological diversity. These examples, which could be multiplied many times over, are cited to make the point that there is nothing conservative about the nature and impact of industrial culture—and the ideology it rests on

#### Giroux’s transformative intellectual hides the imperialism inherent in his own work – it ends up fostering more neo-liberalism

Bowers 05 (Professor at Oregon, Journal of Transformative Education Vol. 3 No. 2, April 2005 116-125)

Another point needs to be made that by identifying the West’s industrial culture as conservative, the followers of Freire and Dewey are able to avoid facing up to the fact that their liberal ideas about the need to emancipate students from what they claim is the oppressive nature of all intergenerational knowledge and traditions makes them complicit in the spread of Western hegemony. The educational approaches to transformative learning—Dewey’s method of experimental inquiry, Freire’s process of conscientization, Giroux’s teacher who is to act as a “transformative intellectual”—even in Islamic cultures, McLaren’s appeal for a “pedagogical negativism” (that is, to doubt everything) and now for them to become followers of Che Guevara’s Marxism, and the professors of education who advocate that students should construct their own knowledge—support the transformative nature of industrial culture in undermining what remains of the world’s diverse commons and thus cultural sites of resistance to the spread of a consumer-dependent and environmentally destructive lifestyle. As I have suggested elsewhere (Bowers, 2001, 2003), the emphasis on constructionist approaches to learning undermine other forms of knowledge and intergenerational renewal that are essential to resisting the spread of the anomic form of individualism that is dependent on consumerism. To make the criticism more directly, these learning theorists do not recognize the importance of the culturally diverse approaches to sustaining the commons—which are conserving in terms of natural systems and cultural traditions of mutual aid and community self-sufficiency.